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In this dissertation, I explore how workers’ human capital, local industry 
composition, and business cycles affect employment outcomes and residential 
migration for job losers and other workers. 
I first examine whether the poor employment outcomes of job losers are due 
to a lack of jobs that require their human capital within their local labor market. I 
answer this question by analyzing the extent to which the industry composition in the 
job loser’s local labor market affects employment outcomes when job loss occurs 
during expansions and during recessions. I find that if job losers reside in an area with 
a high employment concentration of their original industry of employment, they are 
2.1-2.8 percent more likely to be re-employed at another job if job loss occurs during 
an expansion; I find an insignificant relationship in most specifications when job loss 
occurs during a recession, and in some specifications I even find a negative 
relationship between industry concentration and employment. I conclude that the 
 
  
industry composition within an area matters for job losers, since firms are more 
willing to hire workers from within their own industry, as these workers have more 
relevant accumulated human capital. However, firms are less likely to hire during a 
recession, making job losers’ human capital less important for job finding. 
Next, Erika McEntarfer, Henry Hyatt, and I examine whether the business 
cycle affects earnings changes for job losers, and the factors that explain these 
differences across time. We find that job losers who lost their job during the Great 
Recession have earnings changes that are 10 percent more negative relative to other 
job losers from other periods. This result is driven primarily by longer non-
employment lengths and worse subsequent job matches.  
Finally, Erika McEntarfer, Henry Hyatt, Alexandria Zhang, and I explore the 
extent to which residential migration is driven by job opportunities. We use four 
databases and find that changes in job moves explain some of the changes in 
residential migration, but the relationship is not as strong as previously documented. 
We find that migration patterns differ across databases, with some databases 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When workers lose their jobs due to a layoff, why do so many of them have 
long, persistent spells of nonemployment? Is this result due to a lack of nearby jobs, 
or are there jobs that would have hired them if these workers had different skills? 
While there is substantial documentation of these “displaced workers” having poor 
employment outcomes after job losses, we know very little as to how their situation 
can be improved. We know that the labor market outcomes of displaced workers are 
slightly better if they lose their jobs during an expansion relative to a recession (Davis 
and von Wachter, 2011). However, the literature does not indicate whether other 
factors, such as worker human capital and local firm composition, have additional 
impacts on the outcomes of displaced workers during an expansion. We also do not 
know the extent to which these factors affect other labor-related outcomes, such as 
residential migration, for other U.S. workers.   
In this dissertation, I analyze how worker human capital, firm composition, 
and the business cycle affect the labor outcomes of displaced workers after job losses. 
In addition, I investigate how other workers within the U.S. labor force are affected 
by some of these factors. In the first chapter, I examine whether the earnings and 
employment rates of displaced workers improve if these workers reside in an area 
with a high employment concentration of the industry in which they were initially 
employed. I evaluate this relationship when job loss occurs during a recession and 
during an expansion. In the second chapter, my co-authors and I evaluate how 




by recent recessions and expansions, and how much of this variation across time can 
be explained by (i) the variation in the job match quality upon re-employment, and 
(ii) the non-employment duration. In the third chapter, my co-authors and I evaluate 
how job moves have affected residential migration over the past few decades. In the 
first two chapters, I look at different factors behind the large “earnings losses” 
(defined as earnings changes for displaced workers before and after job loss relative 
to those who retained their job during the same time) for displaced workers, and in 
the third chapter, I analyze how some of these factors can affect the labor market 
outcomes of other U.S. workers.  
There is an extensive literature on the employment outcomes of job losers 
(Jacobsen, Lalonde, and Sullivan, 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester, 2009; 
Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2010; Couch and Placzek, 2010). On average, 
displaced workers earn a small fraction of what they used to earn even several years 
after job loss, and we do not know if this result is due to a lack of demand for their 
human capital. At their previous jobs, displaced workers accumulated human capital 
that can be used at all jobs (general human capital), as well as human capital that can 
be used only within their occupation (occupation-specific human capital), industry 
(industry-specific human capital), or firm (firm-specific human capital). There is little 
research on firms’ demand for the various types of human capital of displaced 
workers, and how this demand might vary between expansions and recessions. 
If firms have high demand for relevant industry-specific human capital, then a 
higher concentration of firms in the displaced worker’s original industry should 




I test whether this relationship is true in the first chapter by analyzing how industry 
concentration affects changes in earnings of displaced workers before and after job 
loss. When job loss occurs during an expansion, displaced workers who lose their 
jobs within one of these “concentrated industries” have earnings changes that are 6-12 
percent higher than other displaced workers, and are 2.1-2.8 percent more likely to be 
employed after job loss. However, I find little evidence that concentrated industries 
improve employment outcomes when job loss occurs during a recession, and in some 
specifications I even find a negative relationship between industry concentration and 
earnings changes. I interpret these results as evidence that firms have high demand for 
the industry-specific human capital of displaced workers; however, if firms are not 
hiring, displaced workers’ industry-specific human capital is less likely to matter.  
I then evaluate whether displaced workers with higher levels of industry-
specific human capital (approximated by industry experience) have even better 
outcomes within concentrated industries during an expansion. I test whether industry-
specific human capital is a large factor for the strong effects found in concentrated 
industries during an expansion. I find that displaced workers with more industry 
experience have even better earnings changes within concentrated industries when job 
loss occurs during an expansion; however, industry experience has little effect during 
a recession. This result provides more support that the baseline effects during an 
expansion are a reflection of the valuation placed by firms on industry-specific human 
capital.   
I glean the importance of certain types of human capital through evaluating 




concentrated industries vary by the different phases of the business cycle shows that 
the displaced workers’ “returns” to having certain specific human capital are 
dependent on local conditions. I argue that industry composition, business cycles, and 
human capital are all important factors in providing a comprehensive analysis of 
displaced worker outcomes.  
One of my findings from the first chapter is that average earnings losses 
increase substantially between an expansion and a recession. In my first chapter, I 
used the Great Recession (2007-2009) as my recession period, and the 2005-2006 
expansion years as my expansion period; these periods recorded respectively some of 
the lowest and highest monthly unemployment rates experienced in the US during the 
last fifteen years. The stark differences in outcomes across these two periods lead to 
the question of whether there could be variation in displaced worker outcomes across 
different periods of recessions and expansions.  
There is reason to believe that different recessions could affect displaced 
workers differently. The 2001 Recession, for example, had a peak unemployment rate 
of 5.7 percent in December 2001, while the Great Recession’s (December 2007- June 
2009) peak was close to 10.0 percent in June 2009.1 In addition, the expansion period 
between 2001 and the Great Recession had an unemployment rate at or above 6.0 
percent during April 2003-October 2003, but it dipped to 4.4 percent in December 
2006. This variation in the unemployment rate suggests that job availability varies 
substantially across time, which could lead to variation in earnings losses across time 
based on when a worker loses his job.  
                                                 




In my second chapter, Henry Hyatt, Erika McEntarfer, and I investigate 
whether overall job availability affects the degree of variation in displaced workers’ 
earnings losses across recent expansions and recessions. We also investigate the 
extent to which variation in earnings losses across time is explained by variation in 
non-employment duration after job loss and variation in subsequent job match 
quality. We find that there is considerable variation in earnings losses across different 
recessions and expansions; displaced workers who lost their job during the Great 
Recession experience earnings losses which are nine percent more severe relative to 
those who lost their job during the 2001 Recession, and 16 percent more severe 
relative to those who lost their job during recent expansions. We also find that 
variations in both non-employment length and in job match quality explain a large 
portion of earnings loss variation across time. Of the two factors, non-employment 
plays a bigger role, suggesting that job availability is critical for displaced workers.  
We also investigate the extent to which unemployment insurance might 
possibly mitigate earnings losses across time. We find that even though the 
unemployment insurance was more generously provided during the Great Recession 
relative to other periods, it was not enough to compensate for the higher earnings 
losses suffered by displaced workers. This result shows that job availability is critical 
to the well-being of displaced workers, since external sources do not provide the 
necessary compensation. 
In my dissertation, I also study the effects of business cycles on labor market 
outcomes of U.S. workers who do not suffer job losses. Since job vacancies typically 




during this period (Topel, 1992). Therefore, even workers who do not lose their jobs 
are negatively affected by recessions.  Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) argues 
that residential migration has declined, which could signal a problem for U.S. 
workers if migration is mostly driven by job change. If people are moving less 
because there are fewer job opportunities, then workers are experiencing less earnings 
growth than before, assuming earnings growth is largely due to job change. In 
addition, a decline in migration suggests that many areas are experiencing little to no 
economic growth, since migration matches productive workers to geographic 
locations (Hsieh and Moretti, 2016). 
To test the link between recent long-distance residential migration and job 
moves, Henry Hyatt, Erika McEntarfer, Alexandria Zhang, and I investigate how 
interstate migration and job moves have evolved over the past fifteen years (which 
includes multiple recession and expansion periods). We use four different databases, 
and we find that the Current Population Survey (the dataset previously used by most 
researchers), records the largest decline in the interstate residential migration rate 
with the lowest cyclicality. We find that other databases (American Community 
Survey, IRS public use data, Composite Person Record) record a less steep decline 
with more cyclicality in the residential migration rate. We also find that while job 
moves are associated with interstate residential moves, there is still substantial 
unexplained variation, suggesting that there are additional factors  driving the recent 





Chapter 2: How are Employment Outcomes Affected by Local 
Labor Markets After Job Loss? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
After involuntary job loss, many workers either drop out of the labor force or 
take jobs that pay a small fraction of what they used to earn. In fact, workers 
displaced as part of a mass layoff do not recover to their pre-displacement earnings 
level even several decades after job loss (Jacobsen, Lalonde, and Sullivan, 1993; von 
Wachter, Song, and Manchester, 2009; Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2010; 
Couch and Placzek, 2010). While these effects are well documented by now, we have 
very limited evidence as to why many of these workers cannot find jobs that pay them 
as much as their previous jobs did. One compelling potential explanation is that 
losing one’s job entails a loss of accumulated human capital that cannot be easily 
transferred across jobs, and as a result, other firms are reluctant to hire these workers 
after job displacement. However, we know that displaced workers’ employment 
outcomes improve when there are more jobs available in the vicinity (Davis and von 
Wachter, 2011), which suggests that some of their human capital can be transferred. 
Understanding the type of human capital that is transferrable after job loss, as well as 
how surrounding local labor market characteristics determine job availability, are 
both critical components in fully describing and potentially mitigating the negative 
economic outcomes of displaced workers. 
In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which subsequent employment 




human capital of these workers are transferable. I take the displaced worker’s pre-
displacement firm’s industry employment share within the worker’s local labor 
market as a proxy for the prevalence of jobs where their human capital is relevant. I 
then define “concentrated industries” as industry-CBSA combinations that have a 
high local employment share value, and I evaluate their effects on earnings losses, 
which are defined as earnings changes for displaced workers relative to job stayers. I 
evaluate these effects when job loss occurs during an expansion and during a 
recession. I use the rich panel available in the Longitudinal Employment Household 
Dynamics (LEHD) data, and find that when job loss occurs during an expansion, 
earnings losses are mitigated by 6-12 percent for displaced workers within 
concentrated industries relative to other displaced workers. Therefore, the earnings 
changes for displaced workers relative to job stayers within concentrated industries 
are higher than the same comparison within less concentrated industries. However, 
when job loss occurs during a recession, there is no significant difference in earnings 
losses between displaced workers in “concentrated industries” and other displaced 
workers in most of my empirical specifications, and in other specifications, I find that 
concentrated industries exacerbate earnings losses during a recession. I interpret these 
results as strong evidence that displaced workers can transfer their accumulated 
human capital across firms within an industry when jobs are available. However, 
when jobs are not available, displaced workers are unable to find firms willing to hire 
them even if they have relevant human capital. My results show that the poor 
employment outcomes of displaced workers are partially driven by a scarcity of jobs 




 I identify the earnings loss effects of concentrated industries via a triple 
difference regression, where I compare earnings changes for displaced workers 
relative to job stayers by different levels of industry concentration. I find that 50 to 80 
percent of the earnings loss effects by concentrated industries is due to hiring effects, 
with the rest due to differences in earnings conditional on employment.  Furthermore, 
I find that the employment effects from concentrated industries are largely 
determined by the worker being employed by another firm in the same industry as 
that of the original firm.  
To further justify my argument that the employment and earnings loss effects 
from concentrated industries reflect the importance of transferrable human capital, I 
examine whether displaced workers with more industry experience, and therefore 
more industry-relevant human capital, have even more of a mitigation in earnings 
losses within concentrated industries during an expansion. I find this relationship to 
be true, further suggesting that the employment effects of industry concentration are 
driven by the valuation of human capital that can be used at all firms within an 
industry. 
I use concentrated industries as a proxy for potentially suitable jobs for three 
reasons. First, many workers primarily rely on local firms for employment, and most 
of their job offers will come from these firms. It is crucial to understand how local 
labor markets affect outcomes for workers who lose their jobs since labor market 
recovery is typically very slow after a large negative shock (Topel, 1986; Blanchard 
and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000). Second, there is evidence that it is easier 




industry. When workers transition across jobs within an industry, earnings typically 
increase more relative to when they transition to a job outside the industry (Freedman, 
2008). Third, as I describe in more detail below, the LEHD data I use do not contain 
information on the occupation of workers, and so I cannot use occupation as a 
measure of human capital. 
 To see why some firms would want to hire only certain displaced workers, it 
is important to consider what these workers learn at their previous job, and what type 
of tasks they can perform. While some of their tasks can only be performed at their 
previous firm (firm-specific), displaced workers may also be capable of performing 
tasks that are valued by other firms within the same industry (industry-specific). My 
results suggest that this transferrable “industry-specific human capital” can mitigate 
some of the earnings loss effects from losing firm-specific human capital. 
My results also provide evidence on the magnitude of the return to industry-
specific human capital. My results are consistent with studies within the human 
capital literature that argue that returns to transferrable knowledge for these and other 
types of workers are large (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000; Kambourov and Manovskii, 
2009; Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010; Pavan, 2011). In a departure from this 
previous work, however, I allow for potential heterogeneity in these returns across the 
business cycle, which I show to be a very important distinction. I argue that 
transferrable human capital returns vary across time for displaced workers, since the 
earnings loss effects in concentrated industries are large during an expansion but 
disappear or are sometimes even negative during a recession. Returns to transferrable 




are less likely to hire during this period, which makes it less likely for a displaced 
worker to find a job regardless of the industrial composition in the vicinity or their 
accumulated human capital.  
The richness of the LEHD data allows me to control for a variety of threats to 
identification. The data include migration into favorable economic conditions prior to 
job loss, firm choice of whom to let go, and time-invariant characteristics with fixed 
effects.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: The next section provides my conceptual 
framework; section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical model; section 4 
explains the methodology; section 5 discusses the results, and section 6 concludes. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
For a worker who is displaced from his firm, any new firm that is considering 
hiring the worker will evaluate the worker’s expected future stream of marginal 
productivity for the firm relative to the worker’s expected future stream of wages, and 
will only hire the worker if the latter is at least as big as the former. Any new firm 
that is considering hiring the worker will evaluate the worker’s expected future 
stream of marginal productivity for that firm relative to the worker’s expected future 
stream of wages, and hire the worker only if the former is at least as big as the latter.  
If the worker had accumulated firm-specific human capital at the previous 
employer, this human capital raises the productivity of the worker only in that 
particular firm, and so it was lost upon displacement. As a result, the expected future 
stream of the worker’s marginal productivity will be lower in any firm that chooses to 




the stream of expected future wages paid to a worker will be equal to the expected 
future marginal product of the worker, the worker therefore will earn less following 
displacement due to the loss of firm-specific human capital, and so that worker will 
be worse off following displacement.  
When a worker has accumulated industry-specific human capital and becomes 
displaced, that industry-specific human capital is only lost if the worker cannot find 
new employment in the pre-displacement industry, and so the returns to that industry-
specific human capital are only lost if the worker switches industries.  
 My focus is specifically on the impact of the loss of industry-specific human 
capital. In particular, I consider whether industry concentration in a local labor market 
can mitigate the cost of displacement, and how this varies across the business cycle as 
firms expand and contract their hiring. Although the LEHD data I use for estimation 
has many strengths that allow me to carefully estimate the impact of industry 
concentration on the cost of displacement, one weakness is that it does not contain 
information on the occupations of workers, and thus I cannot separately consider 
occupation-specific human capital. As a result, some of what I estimate as human 
capital that is specific to an industry may be a proxy for human capital that is specific 
instead to an occupation. Further research using other data would be necessary to 
disentangle the two.  
The expected earnings of the displaced worker who has accumulated industry-
specific human capital for the period after job loss can be expressed as the sum of the 
expected earnings from employment with a firm within and outside his pre-




outside his industry, respectively. In my empirical work, I approximate the 
probability of re-employment in the pre-displacement industry with the local labor 
market employment share in the industry. 
I label the wages and hours offered from firms within the same industry as the 
displaced worker’s original industry as  and , respectively. I label the wages and 
hours offered from firms outside of the displaced worker’s original industry as  
and , respectively. The expected earnings for a displaced worker after job loss can 
be written as: 
			 1  
where  and  represent the employment share within and outside of the displaced 
worker’s original industry (where the denominator includes those who are non-
employed). The local employment share is . The remainder is the non-
employed share, which approximates the probability that no job offer arrives (with 
zero earnings).  
 To see how a higher concentration of within-industry firms can affect earnings 
for displaced workers, I rearrange equation 1  to yield the following: 	
1 			 2  
where 1 . The first term in equation 2  denotes the 
difference in earnings offered between firms within and outside of the displaced 
worker’s industry. The second term depends on the share of the non-employed, which 
is a proxy for the probability of not being able to find a job; the share of the non-




Intuitively, equations 1  and 2  can be summarized as follows: When a 
worker finds himself displaced because of a very small local labor demand shock 
affecting only a small number of firms (and perhaps only his previous firm itself), the 
displaced worker is expected to have lower earnings due to the loss of firm-specific 
human capital. Further earnings losses will be a function of the probability that he can 
find employment in the same industry, which is a function of that industry’s 
concentration in the local labor market. In contrast, if the worker is displaced because 
of a significant local labor demand shock, he is at risk of earnings losses due not only 
to lost firm-specific human capital, but also due to lost earnings from non-
employment as well as the possible depreciation of general human capital.  
In my empirical work, I ask two specific questions in order to gauge the 
importance of industry-specific human capital: 
Empirical question 1: Do concentrated industries mitigate poor labor market 
outcomes when job loss is a result of a small local shock that affects only a small 
number of firms? The extent to which concentrated industries mitigate these poor 
employment outcomes will depend on firms’ valuation of industry-specific human 
capital. 
If concentrated industries mitigate poor labor market outcomes for displaced 
workers, a natural follow-up question to empirical question 1 is does the extent of this 
mitigation vary by the extend of accumulated industry-specific human capital?  
 Empirical question 2: Do concentrated industries mitigate poor labor market 
outcomes when job loss is a result of a larger local shock that affects many 




industry-specific human capital is less valued during large negative shocks or if firms 
that would have hired these workers in the absence of a negative shock are unable to 
do so because overall demand is low. 
To summarize, the earnings and employment effects of concentrated 
industries is a reflection of displaced workers’ skill transferability within an industry. 
Furthermore, these effects may vary depending on the magnitude of the local labor 
market, providing evidence that general human capital is not always transferrable if 
there is significant job destruction within a local labor market. In order to empirically 
evaluate these effects, I need to discuss how I define shocks and concentrated 
industries within my data. I also need to control for other factors on the demand side, 
such as firm migration and the firm’s selection to let go of certain workers, decisions 
that I do not discuss in here, but will nonetheless affect my estimates. Lastly, I need 
to control for possible labor supply decisions made by workers before job loss and 
after in order to capture the relevant labor demand relation. I discuss and do all of 




I use the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) and 
Composite Person Record (CPR) administrative databases from the United States 
Census Bureau for this analysis. These datasets contain earnings, employment, and 




The LEHD dataset is submitted by states and the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW). It is an employer-employee linked dataset that has 
comprehensive earnings information for many U.S. workers.2 Since employers 
subject to state UI laws are required to submit accurate worker and workplace 
information to the wage records and QCEW, I am able to observe precise quarterly 
earnings for each worker-employer combination that took place during that quarter 
(with the exception of people within institutions and the federal, state, and local 
governments). The LEHD microdata includes basic demographic information about 
employees (age, sex, education) and employers (NAICS code, location, size).  
The CPR dataset contains detailed geographic information for households 
who submitted tax information or from address information contained in other 
administrative federal data sources. For each year, I am able to observe the zip code, 
state, county, and consequently, Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) of residence.3 I 
am able to link the CPR with the LEHD, which allows me to attribute a geographic 
location for each worker for a given year.4 
 
2.3.2 Sample Creation 
In order to estimate the effect of concentrated industries on employment 
outcomes during expansions and recessions, I need a sample of displaced workers 
                                                 
2 John Abowd et al. (2009) provide a thorough description of how the LEHD is constructed. 
3 A CBSA is defined as a geographical area around an urban center of at least 10,000 people that are 
connected via commuting. CBSAs are defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The CBSA 
is very similar in concept to a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), with the only difference coming 
from the minimum population threshold required for classification (MSAs require at least 50,000 
people). CBSAs are defined by a union of state-counties, and no state-county combination is mapped 
to more than one CBSA. 
4 Although the CPR is broad in its coverage, it does not contain information on individuals who do not 




who exogenously lose their jobs during an expansion, and another sample of 
displaced workers who exogenously lose their jobs during a recession. I also need a 
sample of workers who did not lose their jobs (“job stayers”) with similar 
characteristics to my displaced worker sample. These job stayers will allow me to 
argue that had they not lost their jobs, the displaced workers’ earnings changes would 
have been similar to the job stayers’. Since I am comparing the earnings changes of 
displaced workers and job stayers by industry concentration, I also require similar 
characteristics for these worker types across this dimension. Two characteristics that 
need to be comparable are the workers’ level of industry-specific human capital, and 
the firm-specific human capital in their previous firms for displaced workers and in 
current firms for job stayers. To plausibly argue that the employment effects of 
industry concentration are due to more firms demanding the same level of 
transferrable knowledge across firms in an industry, my sample of workers needs to 
have similar levels of industry-specific human capital across displaced workers and 
job stayers, as well as across industry concentration. I also need to have comparable 
firm-specific human capital cross displaced workers/job stayers and industry 
concentration, since any differences in firm-specific human capital across industry 
concentration can also affect the estimated effects.5  
I therefore need to select displaced workers with long job tenure prior to job 
loss in order to have workers with comparable firm-specific and industry-specific 
human capital. Tenure is a common proxy for firm-specific human capital 
accumulation (Topel, 1991; Altonji and Shakotko, 1989; Abraham and Farber, 1987; 
                                                 
5 If one sample of workers is more reliant on firm-specific knowledge, then they will be less able to 




Altonji and Williams, 2005), but those with long tenure by definition also have 
significant industry experience, since they have spent more time within the firm’s 
industry. This industry experience leads to accumulation of knowledge that is 
transferrable within an industry, i.e., a higher level of industry-specific human capital. 
My sample of job stayers must also have the same restriction to ensure they have 
similar levels of firm-specific and industry-specific human capital. 
Since I am using expansions and recessions as approximations for high and 
low job availability, I need to select an expansion phase with high hiring rates, and a 
recession phase with very low hiring rates. I use data from 2005 Q1 and 2006 Q4 as 
the expansion phase, as this two-year period recorded the lowest unemployment rate 
and the highest job opening rate since 2000.  I use data from 2007 Q4 to 2009 Q2 
(i.e., the Great Recession) as the recession phase.6 Most industries experienced net 
employment losses during the Great Recession (BLS Spotlight on Statistics 2012), 
allowing me to obtain a more representative sample of displaced workers across all 
industries during these years.  
Taking into consideration the business cycle and tenure requirements I 
outlined, I take the following steps to create my sample. I first take all workers who 
experienced displacement during any quarter during my selected expansion and 
                                                 
6 The Great Recession is defined by the NBER as occurring from December 2007 to June 2009. Since I 
can only use quarters, I define the Great Recession as occurring between 2007 Q4 and 2009 Q2. I 
cannot definitively state how well one can extrapolate my findings to other expansions/recessions. 
Most industries experienced very high employment losses during the Great Recession, while in other 
recessions, most of the losses were dominated by a select few industries. Also, the U.S. economy 
experienced a much slower recovery period after the Great Recession relative to other recessions. I 
therefore interpret my estimates for the Great Recession as a lower bound relative to other recessions. I 
also interpret my estimates for 2005-2006 as a lower bound relative to other expansion periods, since 




recession phases.7 I then limit the sample to displaced workers with at least five 
consecutive quarters of tenure to ensure that they had accumulated a sufficient 
amount of firm-specific and industry-specific human capital.8 For each quarter in my 
displaced worker sample, I also construct a one percent random sample of job stayers 
with at least five quarters of tenure prior to that quarter (inclusive), and an additional 
12 consecutive quarters of tenure subsequently. I require all workers to be part of 
both the LEHD and the CPR, and reside within a valid CBSA, the unit I use to define 
a local labor market.  Lastly, I require the worker to have never worked within nine 
states that submitted information to the LEHD only recently, since earnings histories 
for these workers are incomplete.9 
  
                                                 
7 One problem I encounter within my data is I cannot directly observe displacement from an 
establishment. This is a common problem for displaced worker analysis using administrative data, so I 
use a common measure from the literature to proxy for displaced workers. I define a worker to be 
displaced during period  if three criteria are met: (i) There is a 30 percent decrease in the worker’s 
establishment size. To calculate the 30 percent decrease, I use the establishment’s maximum employee 
count from periods 2 and 1, and the minimum value from periods 1 and 2, in order to 
capture potential declining trends in the establishment size; (ii) The maximum employee count in 
periods 1 and 2 is above 50 people; (iii) The worker has to have a “dominant job separation” 
from the establishment in period , i.e., the worker either completely loses employment at this 
establishment, or that establishment no longer provides him with the highest earnings. An example is if 
an establishment has 55, 50, 45, 5, 3 workers during 2002 Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, and 2003 Q1, and if the 
worker separates during 2002 Q3, then the worker is flagged as a displaced worker during 2002 Q3. 
 
8 The five quarter tenure restriction includes the quarter of displacement. Therefore, if a worker loses 
his job during 2002 Q1, he needs to have had that job for every quarter from 2001 Q1 to 2002 Q1, 
inclusive. 
 
9 The first year in my sample is 2005, but I use historical information for workers that go back several 
years before that year. Unfortunately, nine states did not submit information to the LEHD before 2001 
(Alabama, Kentucky, Wyoming, Arkansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Arizona, DC, 
Massachusetts). Therefore, if somebody worked within one of these states before 2001, I am unable to 
observe which firm s/he worked at or how s/he earned. I therefore restrict the analysis to those who I 
never observe to work within these nine states after 2001, with the assumption that those that work 
within these states in later years are more likely to have worked there in previous years.  I do this 
restriction to mitigate some of the measurement error in the employment history, but obviously, there 
is likely to be some measurement error that remains, since some included workers could have worked 





2.3.3 Concentrated Industry Definition, Outcomes of Interest 
I use the earnings changes recorded in the LEHD as the primary outcome in 
my analysis. I define earnings changes by first aggregating earnings across all jobs 
within a six-month interval (half-year), and then taking the difference of the 
aggregated earnings across time for each worker. I define “earnings losses” as the 
earnings change for displaced workers relative to job stayers; the assumption is that 
had the displaced worker not lost his job, his earnings growth would have been the 
same as the job stayers’ during this period. My main empirical question is how 
concentrated industries affect earnings losses within each half-year interval for up to 
three years after job loss for a displaced worker. Since my time window is short 
relative to most papers within the literature, my results can be interpreted as either 
short-run or possibly medium-run effects.10  
I categorize a displaced worker as displaced from a “concentrated industry” 
based on his pre-displacement industry’s employment share within his local labor 
market, using the three-digit North American Industry Classification System to group 
firms as an industry.11 Similarly, I categorize a job stayer as within a concentrated 
industry based on his industry’s employment share. By using the industry share 
instead of the industry size (i.e., employment totals), I avoid over-representing large 
CBSAs in my classification of industry concentration. However, an industry’s high 
                                                 
10 Jacobsen, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2011) evaluate earnings losses over 
a six-year window; Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender (2010) evaluate earnings losses over a 15-
year window. Davis and von Wachter (2011) and von Wachter, Manchester, and Song (2009) evaluate 
earnings losses over a 20-year window.  
11 NAICS defines their three digit codes as a “Subsector”, which is a more coarse definition than an 
industry (defined at the five-digit level). There is little difference in my results using the three, or four-
digit NAICS definitions, but I choose the broadest category to capture firms that are more likely to be 
part of the same production process (Delgado, Porter, and Stern, 2010; 2012). For shorthand purposes, 




employment share is not necessarily a product of being within a labor market with a 
large population.  
I attribute a CBSA to each displaced worker from the CPR during the calendar 
year, and the industry from the firm where he lost his job. For job stayers, I assign the 
CBSA in the same manner, and I assign the industry based on their firm. I then define 
a concentrated industry based on the employment share of that industry within the 
attributed CBSA four quarters prior to the quarter of job loss for displaced workers, 
and the quarter of sample inclusion for job stayers. I choose this timing because I 
want to measure how earnings losses depend on any initial industrial composition 
within the labor market, without incorporating any potential changes in the industrial 
composition after a shock. Formally, my measure is: 
#	 	 ,	 , 	
#	 	 , 	
 
where  refers to the industry of the worker’s initial job,  is the CBSA of 
residence during job loss, and  refers to the quarter four quarters before job loss. The 
denominator is the total number of employed workers within CBSA , and the 
numerator is the total number of employed workers within CBSA  and industry . 
For example, if a worker is displaced from the “electrical equipment, appliance, and 
computer manufacturing” industry (NAICS code 335) within the Akron (Ohio) CBSA 
during 2003 Q3, I use the employment share of that industry within 2002 Q3 for that 
worker. Assuming that job vacancies are positively correlated with availability of 
employment, the industrial concentration has an ordinal property for potential jobs. 
However, I cannot say this metric has a cardinal property, since I cannot quantify the 




rather than looking at a linear relationship, I classify CBSA-industry combinations 
with a  value higher than the 75th percentile within an industry across CBSAs as a 
“Concentrated Industry,” and those lower as a “Non-Concentrated Industry.”12 I 
choose to use the industry’s national distribution as a reference point, since different 
industries have different distributions in the nation, and my concentration definition 
needs to reflect this fact.13 The drawback with this approach is that I will flag some 
industry-CBSAs as concentrated only because the industry has a larger local 
employment share relative to its presence in other CBSAs (e.g., even if industry  has 
only one percent of employment in CBSA , if that share is higher than industry ’s 
local share in other CBSAs, the industry -CBSA  combination will be flagged as 
concentrated). I compare earnings changes for workers within an industry, so 
occasionally classifying industry-CBSAs with a small local employment share as 
concentrated will still be appropriate given that the industry is less concentrated in 
other CBSAs. Continuing with my previous example, displaced workers will be 
flagged as being displaced within a concentrated industry during 2002 Q3 if they: (i) 
reside within CBSA  in 2002 Q3; and (ii) the 	 	 	  is above the 75
th 
percentile for industry 335.14  
  
                                                 
12 The distribution is based on the CBSA level. Therefore, the 75th percentile is determined within an 
industry across CBSAs for a point in time. I restrict CBSA-industries to those with at least 100 
workers. 
13 Ellison and Glaeser (1997), Dumais et al. (2002), Freedman (2008), and Ellison et al. (2010) use 
similar logic. 
14 I find my results to be robust to several percentiles above the median. Another concern is the 
volatility of my industry concentration measure across time, since both firms and workers migrate into 
and out of different locations. If the flow rate into or out of a local labor market has a greater effect on 
one industry relative to other industries, then the industrial employment share will change within a 
local labor market. Appendix Table 2.1 verifies that my classification of industry concentration is 




2.4 Methodology  
I use the sample of displaced workers and job stayers, and run the following 
regression to evaluate the effects of concentrated industries on earnings losses during 
an expansion and during a recession: 
Δ 	
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ 							 1  
 ,  
where Δ  is the change in earnings for worker  across the two half-year intervals. 
For displaced workers, the initial earnings level refers to his earnings during the six 
months prior to job loss, while the subsequent earnings level refers to his earnings 
within a six-month period after job loss.15 I estimate six different regressions for each 
six-month period within the three years following job loss, so the subsequent earnings 
level refers to either: the six months after job loss, 6-12 months after job loss, 12-18 
months after job loss, etc. For job stayers, the initial and subsequent earnings levels 
refer to the same time span, but does not involve job loss.  
  are dummies for worker ’s CBSA residence . Since I am first-
differencing my empirical equation, these dummies capture heterogeneity in the 
earnings trends across CBSAs, allowing me to compare earnings losses within a 
CBSA. These dummies control for observable changes in CBSA characteristics such 
as population changes, as well as characteristics such as changing natural resource 
                                                 
15 I omit the quarter of job loss for this analysis. Since I am unable to pinpoint whether a worker lost 
his job during the first week of a quarter (where he has only one week of earnings for the quarter) or 
the last week (where he earns every week except the last week of the quarter), including this quarter 




advantages and susceptibility to shocks, which are more difficult to quantify and 
which could affect my estimated parameters of interest.  
  is a set of dummies defined as the quarter of displacement for displaced 
workers, and as the same calendar quarter for job stayers.16 These dummies control 
for differences across a business cycle that are unrelated to being in a concentrated 
industry.  are dummies for workers ’s industry, , which refer to either the 
firm he is currently employed at for job stayers, or the firm he was displaced from for 
displaced workers. These dummies capture national industry trends, including 
possible changing rent-sharing practices by certain industries, which could affect the 
interpretation of my estimates. I also include a vector of demographic characteristics 
 (education, gender, race-ethnicity, and age) that I assume to have time-varying 
effects on earnings, which may be correlated with the covariate of interest.17 
 My covariates of interest are ∗  and ∗ ∗ . 
The first term is a product of a dummy that equals 1 if worker  is displaced ( ), and 
another dummy that equals 1 if worker  is part of a CBSA-industry that is flagged as 
concentrated ( ). The second term is a product of the previous two 
dummies as well as another dummy, , which equals 1 if the worker lost his job 
during an expansion. The coefficient on the first term, λ , represents the comparison 
of earnings changes for displaced workers relative to stayers within concentrated 
industries relative to non-concentrated industries during a recession. Therefore, I label 
. The sum of the first and the second term, λ λ , represents the 
                                                 
16 For example, the 2005 Q2 dummy equals 1 for a displaced worker if he loses his job during that 
quarter, and equals 1 for a job stayer if he had at least five quarters of tenure prior to that quarter. 




analogous comparison during an expansion. Therefore, I label . 
With my empirical specification, I am able to track the evolution of these estimates 
across time.18 Since concentrated industry status depends on the CBSA-industry 
combination, I cluster my standard errors by this dimension. 
My identifying assumption relies on no other unobservable factors being 
correlated with either interaction term, conditional on the controls. I do not need to 
worry about time-invariant characteristics that have time-invariant effects, since I 
first-difference my empirical model. I also do not need to worry about trends of 
unobservable characteristics correlated with the CBSA or the industry, since these are 
included as dummies in my model. I discuss and control for specific potential threats 
to these assumptions (endogenous displacement by firms, labor supply decisions by 
workers) in the robustness subsection, and largely focus on my baseline empirical 
model for the results. 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Sample Characteristics  
Figure 2.1 displays the overall earnings trend for the workers in my sample. 
Displaced workers report annual earnings of just below $38,000 prior to job loss, 
$23,000 a year after job loss, $27,000 two years after job loss, and $28,000 three 
years after job loss. These figures suggest an initial earnings decline of 50 percent, 
and a net decline of 30 percent three years after job loss. Job stayers, on the other 
                                                 





hand, start with a higher earnings level, and continue to have steady growth during 
the same period. A similar pattern emerges when I compare the earnings of displaced 
workers and those of job stayers during the expansion and recession periods, since 
within both the expansion and recession periods displaced workers have a large 
decline in earnings while job stayers experience continued earnings growth. However, 
Figure 2.2. shows that the earnings dip for displaced workers is considerably smaller 
relative to job stayers when job loss occurs during an expansion relative to a 
recession. This difference in earnings dip across expansions and recessions could be 
due to the overall scarcity of jobs, or to the scarcity of jobs suited for the displaced 
worker’s skillset. To quantify the extent to which concentrated industries mitigate 
earnings losses, I use the unconditional earnings losses (i.e., the difference in earnings 
changes for displaced workers relative to job stayers) within each period as a 
reference point. For example, if earnings losses for displaced workers are mitigated in 
concentrated industries by $500 across two years during an expansion, and the 
unconditional earnings losses are -$7,500 during this same period, I say that earnings 
losses are mitigated in concentrated industries by 500/7500 = 6.67 percent. 
A natural concern with comparing displaced workers and job stayers across 
the business cycle and by industry concentration is that these workers could have 
differences in characteristics that also affect changes in earnings. Table 2.1 compares 
the demographic characteristics for displaced workers across the business cycle and 
industry concentration. There are some differences across industry concentration, but 
I am unable to conclude whether displaced workers within concentrated industries are 




on these differences. Relative to concentrated industries, non-concentrated industries 
have a higher share of white displaced workers, with the largest difference occurring 
during an expansion (a seven percentage point difference). This difference might 
suggest that displaced workers in non-concentrated industries should have less severe 
earnings losses, for whites have (on average) higher employment rates and higher 
earnings relative to other groups. However, relative to non-concentrated industries, 
concentrated industries have a higher share of male displaced workers, again with the 
largest difference occurring during an expansion (a four percentage point difference), 
suggesting that displaced workers in concentrated industries could have less severe 
earnings losses (since men have higher employment rates and wages relative to 
women). The average age of the workers within my sample is 42 years old, with 11 
years of observed experience, and there is very little difference in both of these 
characteristics between workers in concentrated and non-concentrated industries.19 
Since there are small differences in age and experience, and there is a higher 
prevalence of males in concentrated industries, and a higher prevalence of whites in 
non-concentrated industries, I cannot say which set of workers is more likely to 
experience more severe earnings losses based on compositional differences.20  
Table 2.2 provides the characteristics of the displaced workers’ original firms. 
Unlike demographic characteristics, there are noticeable differences in firm 
                                                 
19 Experience is defined as the number of quarters where the agent had any earnings from any job, 
divided by four. The experience averages increase across time, but that is most likely due to the fact 
that the historical data is more complete (i.e., more states are included) across time. Even though I 
impose a restriction on the states for 2001-2010, I do not impose a restriction for the experience 
statistic. 
20 Appendix Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that job stayers’ demographic and firm characteristics do not 
change substantially across time; hence I focus mostly on the sample of displaced workers. The 
patterns for job stayers are similar to those of displaced workers, i.e., there are some small differences 
in demographic characteristics across industry concentration within a recession/expansion, and there 




characteristics across the business cycle, suggesting that I could be comparing 
displaced workers with different unobservable characteristics across the business 
cycle. The most noticeable difference is that the percentage of workers displaced 
from construction and manufacturing is much larger within the recession period 
relative to the expansion period. During recessions, construction and manufacturing 
shares comprise roughly 33 percent of the sample, while during expansions they 
comprise only 24 percent of the displaced workers. Although there are also noticeable 
differences by industry concentration within expansions/recessions, I am unable to 
conclude which set of workers is likely to experience higher earnings losses based on 
these differences. Although firm size and age differences are negligible, there are 
noticeable supersector differences by industry concentration. Relative to non-
concentrated industries, concentrated industries have a higher share of displaced 
workers from the professional and financial services. Relative to concentrated 
industries, non-concentrated industries have a higher share of displaced workers from 
manufacturing, leisure/hospitality, and education/health. Professional and financial 
services jobs are usually more lucrative than manufacturing or leisure/hospitality 
jobs, but education/health jobs are usually more stable during recessions (BLS 
Spotlight on Statistics, February 2012), so it is not clear whether there should be more 
severe earnings losses in concentrated industries.  
Figure 2.3 shows the earnings evolution of displaced workers relative to job 
stayers by industry concentration status. There are negligible differences in the 
unconditional changes, within both expansions and recessions, but these differences 




Given the clear differences in some demographic and firm characteristics across 
displaced worker categories, the demographic controls as well as the industry and 
CBSA dummies are necessary in order to provide credible estimates. 
 
 
2.5.2 Baseline Estimates 
Table 2.3 presents the estimates from equation 1 . Columns (1) and (2) 
show job loss during an expansion and during a recession, respectively. During an 
expansion, there are more available jobs, allowing displaced workers to have easier 
access out of non-employment, as evidenced by the unconditional earnings losses 
being roughly $2,660 ($10,389-$7,734) less severe six months after job loss during an 
expansion relative to six months after job loss during a recession. This pattern persists 
throughout my time window, for earnings losses are $3,220, $3,000, $2,760, $2,080, 
and $1,620 less severe for each of the 6 months windows after job loss. 21 There are 
significant positive effects in concentrated industries when job loss is concurrent with 
an expansion; earnings losses in concentrated industries are mitigated by roughly 
$400 to $600 across the different earnings changes outcomes, translating to a 6.2-11.8 
percent mitigation in earnings losses over the three year time window.22 Conversely, 
                                                 
21 Just like any difference-in-difference/triple difference estimation strategy, I assume that in the 
absence of the “treatment,” the outcome of the control group(s) would have been similar to that of the 
treatment group. Appendix Table 2.4 has the estimates when I use time intervals before displacement, 
which essentially compares the earnings growth of the workers who eventually lose their jobs. 
Differences are largely insignificant, suggesting that displaced workers are just as comparable to job 
stayers within concentrated industries relative to non-concentrated industries. 
22 The effects of concentrated industries for the six outcomes are: $476, $404, $529, $448, $612, and 
$496. The unconditional average difference in earnings changes for displaced workers versus job 






during a recession, earnings losses in concentrated industries are not significantly 
different than those in non-concentrated industries, and the unconditional average 
earnings losses, as approximated by average displaced worker earnings changes 
minus average job stayer earnings changes, is $2,000 to $3,000 more severe during 
recessions relative to expansions.  
To test the robustness of my results, I first run two initial tests to see how 
changes in my original sample choice affect my baseline estimates. In one test, I 
remove from my sample displaced workers who were recalled back to their original 
firm, since their earnings losses could be mitigated by retaining their original firm-
specific human capital. Appendix Table 2.5 shows that removing these workers from 
my sample has little influence on my results. I calculate another set of estimates after 
restricting my sample to displaced workers and job stayers who are part of the same 
firm; once again, as shown in Appendix Table 2.6, this specification does not affect 
my qualitative results. 
I also test how sensitive my concentrated industry metric is to various 
definitions. As noted earlier, I could flag some industry-CBSAs as concentrated 
because the industry has a high employment share in a CBSA relative to the same 
industry in other CBSAs, and not necessarily because the industry has a high absolute 
local employment share. I therefore remove all workers who are: (i) labelled as 
workers from a concentrated industry; and (ii) from an industry with an industry share 
greater than two percent of the local population (two percent corresponds to roughly 
the 25th percentile of the local employment share for all the workers within 




concentrated industries with a low local employment share. Appendix Table 2.7 
shows that most estimates during an expansion are still positive, and the estimates 
within the recession are still insignificant. 
I also make comparisons across different percentiles to see whether these 
patterns hold across different levels of industry concentration. Appendix Table 2.8 
shows comparisons for the 25th to 50th percentile relative to below the 25th percentile, 
50th to 75th percentile relative to below the 25th percentile, and above the 75th 
percentile relative to below the 25th percentile.23 The results show that within an 
expansion, the mitigation effects increase monotonically across percentile thresholds, 
although the differences are not always significant. During a recession, however, 
mitigation effects (mostly) decrease monotonically, although again the differences are 
not always significant.  
While displaced workers in concentrated industries still incur earnings losses 
during an expansion, their earnings losses are smaller than those of displaced workers 
in less concentrated industries. However, during a recession, local industry 
concentration has less of an impact, sometimes even a negative impact for displaced 
                                                 
23 The regression specification is: 
Δ 	 2550 5075 75
2550 ∗ 5075 ∗ 75 ∗
∗ ∗ 2550 ∗ 5075 ∗ 75
∗ 2550 ∗ ∗ 5075 ∗
∗ 75 ∗ 							 1  
Where 2550  is a dummy that equals 1 if the worker is in an industry-CBSA within the 25th 
percentile to the median of local employment share across CBSAs within an industry. 5075  is 
the equivalent dummy for the median to the 75th percentile, and 75  is the equivalent dummy 
for above the 75th percentile. 
The  estimate compares earnings losses for workers in industry-CBSAs within the 25th percentile 
to the median (i.e., 2550 1) relative to workers in industry-CBSAs that are below the 25th 
percentile during a recession; the  estimate is the analogous estimate during an 
expansion. The other ,  estimates are analogous estimates that compare workers within 
industry-CBSAs in that particular percentile range relative to industry-CBSAs that are below the 25th 




workers, since firms are less willing to hire. Alternatively, firms might be slightly 
more willing to hire displaced workers with relevant industry-specific human capital 
during a recession, but only temporary or part-time work with possibly lower wages, 
which may not provide a sufficient increase in the average earnings effects. Likewise, 
the effects during an expansion may also be driven primarily by hiring or by better 
paying jobs. The positive effects of industry concentration during expansions provide 
evidence that displaced workers have skills that are demanded by firms within an 
industry, and if more of these firms are hiring, displaced workers are more likely to 
find jobs.  
Table 2.4 presents the results from the same kind of regression model with 
employment as the dependent variable, allowing me to gauge whether the earnings 
losses in Table 2.3 are driven primarily by hiring differences or by other factors.24 In 
Columns 1 and 2, I define employment as binary in this model, with 1 indicating 
positive earnings during that half-year and 0 indicating negative earnings.25 I find that 
the overall employment regression estimates mirror the earnings loss estimates 
closely, but there are some interesting differences; during expansions, displaced 
workers in concentrated industries experience a significant 1.6-2.1 percentage point 
increase in the probability of being employed after job loss throughout the period of 
my analysis. Using a back of the envelope calculation, these effects imply that 
employment probability differences explain roughly 50 to 80 percent of the earnings 
                                                 
24 While this is now a cross-sectional regression and not a first-difference regression, since by 
definition everyone in my sample is employed during the 6 month period prior to job loss, this 
regression is very similar to evaluating employment status changes. 
25 I do not include job stayers in these estimates, since job stayers are by definition always employed. 
Therefore, my empirical equation for the employment regressions is:Y 	





loss effects of industry concentration during expansions.26 This result provides 
evidence that hiring is an important factor behind the earnings effects of concentrated 
industries, but the combination of hours and wages plays a non-negligible role as 
well. For recessions, however, a slightly different pattern emerges. For the first six 
months after job loss, concentrated industries experience significant and negative 
effects, followed by a year and a half of no significant effects, and then significant 
and positive effects for the last year. Initially, these results suggest that despite slight 
differences in hiring patterns, the jobs that do hire do not pay well enough to produce 
a noticeable effect in mitigating average earnings losses during a recession.27  
To further investigate the type of employment behind the earnings change 
effects in concentrated industries, I assess whether the displaced worker is re-hired by 
his original industry. The results are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4. I 
define the outcome as a binary variable, with 1 representing the displaced worker re-
employed within the same industry as his initial job, and 0 representing all other 
outcomes. Unsurprisingly, during an expansion, the effects of a concentrated industry 
are larger for this outcome relative to overall employment, with effects ranging from 
3.3-3.8 percentage points, which translates to a 7.8-9.6 percent increase. What is more 
interesting, however, is that during a recession, most of the effects are positive and 
                                                 
26 I obtain these percentages by doing the following: I first take the employment effect estimate, and 
divide by the unconditional employment probability to get a percentage effect. I then multiply this 
percentage effect by the unconditional post-job loss earnings average. I then take this product, and 
divide by the earnings change effect from Table 2.3. For example, within an expansion, 18 months 
after job loss, the estimate is 0.019, the percentage effect is 0.019/0.81 = 2.3 percent, the unconditional 
earnings average is $14,146, and the earnings change effect is $529.. Therefore, the percentage 
explained by employment is 0.023*14,146/529 = 62.7 percent.. 
27 This is not a product of migration outflows, i.e., workers from concentrated industries moving away 
from a shock. Appendix Table 2.9 shows that during an expansion, workers from a concentrated 
industry are more likely to stay, suggesting that these workers think that they have better opportunities 




significant. For the first half-year, the effect is insignificant, but the within-industry 
employment effects subsequently range from 1.5-2.8 percentage points, which 
translates to a 4-8.7 percent increase. This result suggests that concentrated industries 
are still more likely to hire workers during a recession, but given the lack of earnings 
loss effects, these jobs are not paying sufficiently high wages to have an overall 
positive effect in terms of mitigating average earnings losses. 
To test whether industry-specific human capital is the driving force behind 
these effects, I look at potential heterogeneity by assessing the degree of industry 
experience the displaced worker had accumulated prior to job loss. If earnings losses 
are mitigated in concentrated industries through higher valuation of industry-specific 
human capital, then displaced workers in concentrated industries with more industry-
specific human capital should experience an even larger mitigation in earnings losses 
during an expansion. Furthermore, during recessions, since the available jobs do not 
pay that much, it is unlikely that having more industry-specific human capital will 
help mitigate earnings losses. 
Formally, I estimate: 
Δ 	 ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
				 2 	28 
                                                 
28 Note that  represents the appropriate intercepts/interaction terms.	
≡ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗




I use the same notation as in equation 1 . I estimate the equation above separately 
within my expansion and recession period.29 I include three different variables to 
proxy for three different forms of human capital: tenure, which approximates firm-
specific human capital; industry experience, which approximates industry-specific 
human capital; and overall work experience, which approximates general human 
capital. I include experience and tenure to test whether the effects from the industry 
experience parameter are spurious, since industry-specific human capital should be 
the only component that influences the effects of concentrated industries. The 
parameters , , and  capture the earnings changes for displaced workers 
relative to job stayers by industry concentration, and across human capital levels (for 
industry-specific, general, and firm-specific human capital, respectively). 
Unsurprisingly,  most resembles the patterns in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, as shown in 
Table 2.5. During an expansion, when the effects of industry concentration on 
reducing earnings losses are positive and significant, the  coefficient is likewise 
positive and significant, implying that those with higher levels of industry-specific 
human capital experience greater mitigation of earnings losses.30 Furthermore,  is 
insignificant, while  is negative and significant. These results reinforce my 
hypothesis that industry-specific human capital allows displaced workers to find jobs 
with higher pay in concentrated industries when job vacancies are more prevalent. 
During a recession,  is not significant,  is negative and significant, while 
                                                 
29 The alternative is that I estimate one model with data from both my expansion and recession periods, 
and include an additional interaction term to reflect differential effects during these two periods. The 
results do not change significantly either way. 
30 Within my sample, the 10th, 25th, 75th , and 90th percentile of industry experience is 2.5, 4, 17, and 26 
half years. Therefore, when incorporating these levels with the effects in Table 2.5, it is clear that  




 is positive (but small in magnitude) and significant for all periods after job loss. 
Given that earnings losses were not mitigated in concentrated industries during a 
recession, these results show that industry experience effects are correlated with the 
earnings loss effects of industry concentration when job loss occurs during a 
recession.31  
My interpretation of the results so far is that these earnings loss estimates are 
driven by firm decisions, and do not consider the worker’s decision making process. 
However, workers could either systematically move to more favorable conditions 
prior to job loss or wait for better opportunities after job loss, and if these actions vary 
by prevalence across industry concentration, I could be picking up the effects from 
these labor supply decisions in my estimates. In addition, concentrated industries 
could have firms that are more or less selective in whom they displaced, which could 
also affect my estimates, since this is not part of my intended relationship of interest. 
In the next section, I explore the possibility of selection and other threats to my 
identification strategy. 
 
                                                 
31 The accumulation of the effects of industry-specific human capital are not likely due to any spurious 
correlation with age, i.e., the possibility that older workers are enjoying additional positive effects. In 
Appendix Table 2.10, I show that this is not a concern, since there is very little variation in the effects 
of concentrated industries by age. Note that there are varying effects of concentrated industries by 
education level. Appendix Table 2.11 and 2.12 show earnings and employment breakdown by 
education. The earnings losses of displaced workers with high education are mitigated in an expansion, 
providing evidence that firms value the interaction of industry-specific human capital with the general 




2.5.3 Labor Supply Investigation 
2.5.3.1 Labor Supply Decisions Made After Job Loss 
One threat to my identification strategy comes from possible labor supply 
decisions made by displaced workers after job loss. Some displaced workers may 
choose to wait for better job offers if they are unsatisfied with the job offers they 
receive shortly after job loss. As a result, these workers would prolong their non-
employment duration, which would obviously exacerbate their earnings losses. This 
scenario may be more likely to occur during an expansion, where the option value of 
waiting for a job offer is higher than the option value during a recession. If workers 
are more likely to wait for better offers in a concentrated industry, my OLS estimates 
are more likely to be biased downward during an expansion. Given that I am 
interested in how firm decisions drive the employment effects of concentrated 
industries, I do not need to remove labor supply effects entirely; rather, I need to 
ensure that any labor supply effects are the same across industry concentration status.  
Workers are more likely to wait for better job offers if they have sufficient 
liquidity to remain in non-employment.32 In order to mitigate this effect, I look at the 
effects of concentrated industries for people who I consider to be liquidity 
constrained, as proxied by worker earnings of less than $20,000 during the year prior 
to displacement.33 Table 2.6 provides the results from this specification. Positive 
                                                 
32 Another factor is if the worker believes that the shock is temporary, and that these firms will offer 
high paying jobs in the near future. If the worker believes that the shock is permanent, then he is more 
likely to switch industries.  
33 $20,000 corresponds to roughly the 25th percentile in the sample of displaced workers, and the 20th 
percentile in the sample of job stayers. I assume that other sources of income are constant. Income 
provided by the government, such as unemployment insurance, should be partially accounted for by 
the CBSA dummies in my empirical model to the extent that they are similar across individuals within 
a CBSA. I assume that other sources of non-labor income such as family transfers are the same on 




effects remain for job loss during an expansion, but they are smaller in magnitude and 
are less persistent. For the first 18 months after job loss, the effects are significant, 
ranging from 4.8 to 14.8 percent of overall earnings losses. However, these effects 
become insignificant for the remainder of the period. The effects during a recession 
are significant and negative for the first year after job loss, but they are very small 
(less than 3.7 percent).  
There is little evidence consistent with labor supply effects during a recession, 
but there is seemingly some evidence during an expansion, since some of the effects 
of concentrated industries are insignificant after 18 months. While workers could wait 
for better jobs during an expansion, these labor supply decisions will most likely 
affect earlier estimates rather than later ones, since workers are more likely to make 
these decisions shortly after job loss, and not two years after job loss. Therefore, I 
cannot definitively say that this new result is a product of removing labor supply 
effects. This result could simply be due to selection, since I am focusing on low-
income workers who likely had not accumulated a lot of industry-specific human 
capital. Therefore, more rigorous econometric techniques are required to purge labor 
supply effects from my baseline analysis. 
2.5.3.2 Labor Supply Decisions Made Before Job Loss, Firm Selection 
In this section, I control for labor supply decisions made before and after job 
loss, as well as the firm’s decision to displace certain workers over others. 









where  represents the threat to identification from the firm’s decision to displace 
certain workers over others,  represents labor supply decisions made before job 
loss, and  represents labor supply decisions made after job loss. Finally,  is noise 
assumed to be uncorrelated with being employed in a concentrated industry 
( ), being displaced ( ), or being included in the sample during an 
expansion or a recession ( ). Formally, I test: 
, ∗ 	|	 , , , ∗ , ∗ 0 
and	
, ∗ ∗ 	|	 , , , ∗ , ∗
0, 1, 2, 3.  
I treat  and  as time-varying threats, even though job loss is a one-time 
occurrence for most of the displaced workers in my sample, and sorting to different 
areas occur prior to the start of my analysis. Displacement in general is a one-time 
event for most workers, but have clear time-varying implications, so firm decisions 
leading to displacement could also have time-varying implications. Since sorting can 
lead to different types of workers with varying characteristics and skillsets that could 




My first potential threat ( ) is if displacement itself is related to industry 
concentration. For example, if firms are more likely to let go of skilled workers in 
concentrated industries relative to non-concentrated industries during an expansion, 
these workers are more likely to find a higher paying job, causing an upward bias in 
my  estimate. One way to glean the direction and magnitude of this selection 
mechanism is by assessing the number of co-workers who left the firm before the 
displaced worker lost his job. A higher incidence of co-workers voluntarily leaving 
prior to his job loss suggests that displaced workers were either less aware of 
potential job loss, or less desirable to firms in the vicinity such that they could not 
leave the firm until the firm chooses to lay him off. In both scenarios, these displaced 
workers should have higher earnings losses, since unexpected shocks are usually 
more detrimental for subsequent employment (Topel, 1986), or these workers are less 
desirable to potential employers. I therefore investigate whether displaced workers in 
concentrated industries had co-workers who were more likely to leave relative to 
other displaced workers. In Appendix Table 2.13, my dependent variable is the total 
number of co-workers who left via a voluntary job-to-job flow eight quarters before 
the displaced worker lost his job.34  While there is on average a high number of co-
workers who voluntarily leave the firm prior to the displaced worker’s quarter of job 
loss (on average, 430 co-workers leave during a local shock and 310 co-workers leave 
during an idiosyncratic shock), none of the estimates are significant, indicating that 
                                                 
34 I cannot observe voluntary job-to-job flows within the data. Therefore, I use job-to-job flows that 
involve a within quarter or adjacent quarter dominant job-to-job flow as a proxy. Hyatt and McEntarfer 
(2012) show that this measure is very pro-cyclical, which is an expected property from voluntary 
separations. I select two years prior to job loss rather than one year prior to job loss to avoid potential 
misclassification of these people as other displaced workers who were hired in another job 




displaced workers in concentrated industries were just as (un)aware of impending job 
loss as their counterparts in non-concentrated industries.35 This result suggests that if 
firms select which workers to let go, the selection process does not vary by industry 
concentration status. 
My second potential threat ( ) comes from the fact that prior to job loss, 
some workers may have moved to a local labor market with better employment  or 
earnings opportunities, or to places that would better for their labor outcomes should 
job loss occur. Since there are large, positive returns to geographic sorting for some 
workers (Ham, 2011; Kennan and Walker, 2011), I could unintentionally capture 
effects from comparing people of different residential migration ability.  
In order to purge the endogeneity of  and  from my initial estimates, I first 
limit the data to displaced workers who lost their jobs due to plant closings, since 
firms do not choose to keep any workers during plant closings. By doing so, I control 
for the endogeneity of  . I then limit the data once again to those whom I consider to 
be “low migration ability” workers. By focusing on these workers, the estimated 
parameter of interest will more likely reflect the true effects from concentrated 
industries, since these workers are less likely to have sorted into the area and are thus 
more likely taking the conditions as a given.  Empirically, it is very difficult for 
researchers to observe which workers have high migration ability and which workers 
do not. In order to approximate workers who cannot easily migrate across regions, I 
focus on workers who reside within their birth state, a common approximation used 
within the literature (e.g., Ham, 2011). However, staying in one’s birth state is not an 
                                                 
35 The fact that more co-workers left during an idiosyncratic shock further substantiates that I am more 
likely capturing voluntary job-to-job flows rather than other displaced co-workers who lost their jobs 




exogenous act, so after restricting my sample to workers who are part of plant 
closings, I use a control function approach to control for the endogeneity associated 
with living in one’s birth state. Formally, I estimate the following equation: 
Δ 	 ∗
̂ 			 3  
where ̂ ≡ ̂ ̂  
and ,  
The notation is the same as before, and ̂  refers to the control function. I 
no longer include job stayers in my equation, since the sample is now restricted to 
displaced workers who are part of plant closings. An additional difference between 
equation 3  and equation 1  is that instead of having CBSA dummies ( ), I 
now include a set of covariates  with the CBSA’s population interacting with the 
region of the worker’s state of residence. This is because I use a nonlinear function to 
estimate ̂ ; including too many dummy variables will give rise to an incidental 
parameters problem.36 
To estimate the control function, after restricting my data to workers who 
were part of plant closings (and therefore removing job stayers), I estimate a probit 
model where the dependent variable is whether the worker lives within his/her birth 
state. The covariates in the probit model are all of the variables in equation 3  
(with the exception of the ̂  term) and the following additional variables: the 
number of children under 6, the number of children under 18, and a vector of 
                                                 
36 The baseline estimates do not change by a significant amount when I use the CBSA characteristics 
as opposed to the original CBSA dummies, so any differences in the results is not due to this 




dummies for the state s/he was born in.37 I then estimate a linear and quadratic form 
of the propensity score, which form the ̂  term in equation 3 . 
Unfortunately, I am unable to directly control for labor supply decisions made 
after job loss, since I have exhausted most of the variables in the datasets. I therefore 
assume that by controlling for labor supply decisions before job loss, I control for 
labor supply decisions made after job loss. For this analysis, this assumption is 
realistic, since the main labor supply channel after job loss is whether workers will 
voluntarily stay out of employment to wait for better jobs to become available. This 
decision is only feasible if the worker has sufficient liquidity. Residential moves also 
require considerable liquidity, so if I control for one supply decision, I can reasonably 
assume that I control for the other.  
Table 2.7 shows the estimated effects from equation 3 . The estimated 
effects are now insignificant, which implies that either all of my baseline estimates 
were driven by selection, or my current specification masks the effects I am interested 
in.38 To explore the latter scenario, rather than using expansions and recessions, I use 
a more precise way of measuring local job availability. I use the Bartik Index (Bartik, 
1991), which predicts the magnitude of a local labor market’s demand shock by using 
national industry employment trends along with the local labor market’s initial 
                                                 
37 I assume that if the worker is residing with a person under 18 years old, then he/she is a guardian of 
the child. I use a linear and a squared term for the propensity score to approximate the true function of 
the selection.  
38 Although I do not present the results, my original specification is not sensitive to removing job 
stayers from my analysis, i.e., the results in Table 2.3 are driven primarily by displaced workers, and 
not job stayers. An alternative explanation as to why the results in Table 2.7 differ from Table 2.3 is 
the composition of workers in Table 2.7 is not representative of the original sample. Appendix Table 
2.14 shows that the estimates for the specification without the propensity score inclusion are not 
significant. The estimates are significant when the sample is restricted to those who were part of plant 





industrial composition to classify what type of local demand shock the displaced 
worker’s job loss was concurrent with. I assume that every displaced worker loses 
his/her job due to a negative demand shock that affected his/her original firm, but 
other firms in the vicinity could either be experiencing employment growth due to 
positive demand shocks, or employment losses due to negative demand shocks. I use 
the Bartik Index’s value of a CBSA-year to classify the extent to which other firms 
were likely to hire a displaced worker at the time of job loss. I categorize each CBSA-
year as having either a “large” negative local demand shock, a “medium” sized 
negative local demand shock, or a “small” negative local demand shock, with the last 
group including cases where the local labor market experienced a positive shock. For 
brevity, however, I classify both local labor markets with small local negative 
demand shocks and local labor markets with positive demand shocks as “small 
negative demand shocks”.39 After classifying CBSA-year combinations as having one 
                                                 
39 I use the Bartik Index instead of total CBSA employment changes because the latter can be driven 
by local supply changes, whereas the Bartik Index usually captures local demand changes (Bound and 
Holtzer, 2000). Formally, the index is: ∑ , where  is the national employment growth 
within the six-digit industry  between two years of interest, and  is the share of employment for six-
digit industry  within CBSA  during the year prior to the two years of interest. For a given year, I 
evaluate this index three separate times for the one-, two-, and four-year industry employment changes. 
Therefore, if a displaced worker loses his job in 2005, the one-year difference looks at the difference in 
employment from 2004 to 2005; the two-year difference, from 2003 to 2005, and the four-year 
difference, from 2001 to 2005. I use three separate differences to account for potential persistent 
effects a few years after the occurrence of a negative shock. To determine the magnitude of CBSA-
specific shocks, I first calculate one-, two-, and four-year Bartik indices for each CBSA-year 
combination, for all years from 2004 to 2010. I then limit the data to the CBSA-years that had positive 
or negative Bartik index values for each of the one-, two- and four-year calculations for the next step in 
determining idiosyncratic or local shocks. I then calculate a distribution of the Bartik indices for just 
the CBSA-years that had positive or negative Bartik values. I then flag the CBSA-years as having a 
small shock if either the one-, two-, or four-year Bartik indices was larger than the median of the 
corresponding distribution, and a large shock if either of the indices was smaller than the median. I 
classify all other CBSA-years as medium. For the one year calculations, if the CBSA-year has a Bartik 
Index above 0.02, it is a small shock, while if it is below -0.035 it is a large shock. For the two year 
calculations, if the CBSA-year has a Bartik Index above 0.03, it is a small shock, while if it is below -
0.065 it is a large shock. For the four year calculations, if the CBSA-year has a Bartik Index above 
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̂ ≡ ̂ ̂  
, ,  
where  is a dummy that equals 1 if the local shock is a small shock, 
and  is a dummy that equals 1 if it is a large shock; the omitted category is a 
medium shock. The estimates of interest are , , and , which 
describe the earnings loss effects for displaced workers relative to job stayers by 
industry concentration when job loss is concurrent with a small, medium, or large 
negative demand shock, respectively. Table 2.8 presents the results using this 
specification, both with and without the propensity score used as a control. Without 
the control function, the effects of concentrated industries are large, positive, and 
significant during small local shocks, mitigating earnings losses by 7-12 percent. The 
effects are negligible during medium local shocks, but the most noticeable result is 
that earnings losses in concentrated industries are significantly and negatively 
exacerbated during large local shocks by roughly 6.5-8.5 percent, which is evidence 
that these workers’ industry-specific human capital is actually a hindrance to earnings 
recovery, at least initially. However, given that the exacerbation effects of 
concentrated industries during large shocks disappear a year after job loss, this pattern 




recession as reported in my baseline specification. The effects remain significant after 
including the control function, which suggests that either selection plays a very small 
effect in this part of my analysis, or it was already handled by the first-differencing in 
my empirical model. These results show that by focusing on the selection effects 
within expansions and recessions, I hid some of the heterogeneity in the earnings loss 
mitigation effects by concentrated industries, since even within an expansion, some 
local labor markets experience large negative demand shocks (and conversely, some 
local labor markets experience employment growth during a recession). By focusing 





Displaced workers often struggle to find jobs that paid their initial salary after 
job loss, and a popular explanation is that this outcome is due to a loss of firm-
specific human capital, which cannot be transferred across firms. I highlight the fact 
that the loss of industry-specific human capital is also an important driver of earnings 
losses, since when there are more firms in the same industry in the vicinity, the 
employment outcomes of displaced workers are not as severe in expansions, but may 
actually be more severe in recessions when firms are contractingimprove These 





There is scope for future work focusing on the role of occupation or other 
factors that more closely resemble a worker’s day-to-day activity. Pavan (2011) and 
Kamberouv and Manovskii (2009) both highlight the importance of occupation, but 
unfortunately, as mentioned above, the LEHD does not contain the same rich data on 
occupation as it does on industry. Future work can also analyze how input-output 
linkages affect displaced workers in a concentrated industry. If firm production is 
more dependent on other nearby firms due to product space relations, then it is likely 
that a negative demand shock in one firm will affect other firms. If there are some 
industry clusters with high input-output relations, then displaced workers within these 
clusters are unlikely to have similar outcomes to those in other types of clusters, since 
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Figure 2.1: Earnings Evolution for Displaced Workers and Job Stayers 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. I use earnings from all of the 





Figure 2.2: Earnings Evolution for Displaced Workers and Job Stayers: Business Cycle 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 




Expansion” category consists of displaced workers who lost their jobs during any quarter from 2005 Q1 to 2006 Q4. The “Job Stayers, Expansion” category 
consists of displaced workers who met the job stayer requirements during any quarter from 2005 Q1 to 2006 Q4. The “Displaced Workers, Recession” category 
consists of displaced workers who lost their jobs during any quarter from 2007 Q4 to 2009 Q2. The “Job Stayers, Recession” category consists of displaced 





Figure 2.3: Earnings Evolution for Displaced Workers Relative to Job Stayers: Business Cycle and Concentrated Industry 
Status 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. “Concentrated industry” is 
defined based on the employment share of the displaced worker’s pre-displacement industry. The y-axis shows the difference in the average earnings of the 












Table 2.1: Demographic and Work History Characteristics of Displaced Workers 
  All   Expansion   Recession 
  Concentrated 
Not 
Concentrated   Concentrated
Not 





Hispanic 24% 21%   24% 20%   23% 22% 
White, Not 
Hispanic 54% 61%   54% 61%   55% 60% 
Black, Not 
Hispanic 14% 12%   14% 12%   14% 11% 
Asian, Not 
Hispanic 6% 4%   5% 4%   6% 4% 
Other, Not 
Hispanic 2% 2%   2% 1%   2% 2% 
Male 58% 56%   55% 51%   60% 59% 
Age 42 42   41 42   42 42 
  
Work History 
Experience 10.8 11.0   10.0 10.1   11.4 11.6 
Industry 
Experience 4.6 5.1   4.4 4.8   4.8 5.3 
Tenure 2.4 2.7   2.2 2.5   2.5 2.8 





Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 
to 2012. Experience is defined as the total number of quarters in which the agent had any earnings. Industry experience is defined as the total number of quarters 
in which the agent had any earnings in the same industry as his pre-displacement industry. Tenure is defined as the total number of consecutive quarters at the 





Table 2.2: Firm and CBSA Characteristics of Displaced Workers 
  All   Expansion   Recession 
  Concentrated
Not 
Concentrated   Concentrated 
Not 




Firm Size, Firm Age Characteristics 
Firm size >  499 43% 42%   43% 43%   42% 41% 
Firm age > 3yrs 90% 91%   89% 91%   91% 92% 
  
Supersector Characteristics 
Construction 15% 15%   13% 13%   16% 17% 
Manufacturing 10% 18%   8% 15%   11% 20% 
Trade, Transportation, 
and Utilities 13% 17%   13% 18%   13% 17% 
Information 3% 2%   3% 2%   3% 2% 
Financial Activities 9% 3%   9% 2%   8% 3% 
Professional and 
business services 36% 6%   35% 6%   36% 7% 
Education and health 
services 4% 24%   6% 28%   3% 20% 
Leisure and hospitality 4% 10%   5% 12%   4% 9% 
Other 6% 5%   7% 5%   5% 5% 
  
CBSA Characteristics 
Total People 3.8 Million 3.9 Million   4.0 Million 4.0 Million   3.7 Million 3.8 Million 





Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 
to 2012. Firm size, firm age, and supersector are determined by the firm at which the worker was displaced. Average CBSA population size is determined by first 
attributing the CBSA of residency to each agent at the time of displacement, then determining the population size of the CBSA during that time, and then taking 





Table 2.3: Earnings Change Regression Estimates for Displaced 
Workers: Effects of Concentrated Industries Within The Business Cycle
  λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $476*** -$69 
($135) ($146) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$7,734 -$10,389 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $404*** -$101 
($110) ($125) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,004 -$8,225 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $529*** $96 
($118) ($141) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,100 -$8,104 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $448*** $21 
($106) ($135) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,598 -$7,360 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $612*** $129 
($122) ($133) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,170 -$7,247 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $496*** -$1 
($121) ($120) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,947 -$6,563 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 




first three rows is the change in earnings defined as total earnings six months after job loss minus total earnings six months prior to job loss. The outcome for the 
next three rows is total earnings twelve months after job loss minus total earnings six months prior to job loss, and so on. Unconditional earnings losses is the 
difference in the average earnings changes of the displaced workers relative to job stayers. λExpansion is defined as λ1 λ2 from equation 1 , while λRecession is 
defined as λ1 from the same equation. *** represents significance at the 1 percent level; ** represents significance at the 5 percent level; * represents significance 




Table 2.4: Employment Regression Estimates for Displaced Workers: Effects of 
Concentrated Industries Within The Business Cycle 
  Employment 
Same Industry 
Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss 0.021*** -0.010** 0.034*** 0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unconditional Employment 0.754 0.643 0.432 0.369 
6-12 Months After Job Loss 0.019*** -0.004 0.038*** 0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Unconditional Employment 0.811 0.695 0.434 0.375 
12-18 Months After Job Loss 0.019*** 0.000 0.035*** 0.018*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unconditional Employment 0.810 0.708 0.402 0.352 
18-24 Months After Job Loss 0.017*** 0.003 0.033*** 0.020*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unconditional Employment 0.807 0.726 0.383 0.343 
24-30 Months After Job Loss 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unconditional Employment 0.792 0.737 0.359 0.329 
30-36 Months After Job Loss 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 





Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 
to 2012. Columns (1) and (2) use any employment as the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) use “same industry employment” as the dependent variable, 
which is a dummy equaling 1 if the displaced worker is re-employed in the same industry as his pre-displacement industry, and 0 otherwise. λExpansion is defined 
as λ1 λ2 from equation 1 , while λRecession is defined as λ1 from the same equation. *** represents significance at the 1 percent level; ** represents 





Table 2.5: Earnings Loss Effects by Human Capital Accumulation 
  Expansion Recession 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  λind exp*Disp*Conc  λexp*Disp*Conc  λtenure*Disp*Conc  λind exp*Disp*Conc  λexp*Disp*Conc  λtenure*Disp*Conc  
0-6 Months After 
Job Loss $38*** $4 -$56*** $23*** $7** -$39** 
($10) ($6) ($14) ($5) ($3) ($15) 
6-12 Months After 
Job Loss $23*** -$5 -$26*** $6 $6** -$34*** 
($5) ($4) ($9) ($5) ($3) ($12) 
12-18 Months After 
Job Loss $31*** -$5 -$27*** $12 $6* -$30*** 
($5) ($4) ($8) ($6) ($3) ($12) 
18-24 Months After 
Job Loss $26*** -$1 -$32*** $7 $8** -$28** 
($5) ($4) ($8) ($6) ($3) ($11) 
24-30 Months After 
Job Loss $27*** -$1 -$26*** $10 $8** -$23** 
($6) ($4) ($8) ($6) ($3) ($10) 
30-36 Months After 
Job Loss $24*** $1 -$32*** $7 $9*** -$25** 
($6) ($4) ($8) ($6) ($3) ($10) 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. The dependent variable is 
change in earnings. The estimates are the output from equation 2 . Columns (1)-(3) contain the estimates when estimating equation 2  during an expansion, 





Table 2.6: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change in 
Earnings for Low-Income Workers 
  λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $133*** -$114** 
($59) ($51) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$2,799 -$3,543 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $238*** -$99* 
($66) ($59) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$1,610 -$2,737 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $154** -$62 
($74) ($63) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$1,773 -$2,893 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $92 -$80 
($77) ($66) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$1,381 -$2,519 
24-30 Months After Job Loss -$23 -$45 
($83) ($68) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$1,783 -$2,672 
30-36 Months After Job Loss -$11 $19 
($86) ($75) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$1,520 -$2,305 
 
Notes: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure and who earned less than $20,000 prior to job 
loss for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following 
criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same 




Table 2.7: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change 
in Earnings (Control Function Approach) 
  λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $290 -$235 
($224) ($216) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$8,084 -$10,739 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $293 -$178 
($201) ($200) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,933 -$8,817 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $219 -$40 
($200) ($217) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,276 -$8,189 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $223 -$26 
($179) ($197) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,031 -$7,420 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $248 $108 
($186) ($180) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,122 -$6,846 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $132 $131 
($182) ($199) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,273 -$6,260 
 
Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers: (i) with at least five quarters of tenure; (ii) who are part of a company shut-down; (iii) who resided in 
the same state as the state of birth during job loss; (iv) who resided in a state that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. A linear and 
qudratic propensity score is included in the model. The dependent variable in the propensity score estimate is whether the displaced worker resided in the same 
state as the state of birth. The excluded instruments for that stage are state of birth and the number of children under six and under 18. The first stage is estimated 





Table 2.8: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change in Earnings by the Severity of Local 
Shocks (Control Function Approach) 
  
Plant closers and reside within the 
same state 
Plant closers and reside within the 
same state - Control Function 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  λsmall  λmedium λlarge  λsmall  λmedium λlarge  
0-6 Months After Job Loss $594** -$256 -$698*** $582** -$275 -$723*** 
($269) ($235) ($279) ($267) ($236) ($279) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$8,516 -$9,752 -$12,003 -$8,516 -$9,752 -$12,003 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $552*** -$180 -$583** $541*** -$196 -$604** 
($181) ($236) ($298) ($180) ($236) ($296) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,347 -$7,785 -$10,053 -$5,347 -$7,785 -$10,053 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $603*** -$82 -$654* $582*** -$109 -$689** 
($186) ($232) ($346) ($184) ($231) ($344) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,993 -$7,365 -$8,032 -$4,993 -$7,365 -$8,032 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $519*** -$72 -$448 $497*** -$97 -$480 
($174) ($210) ($306) ($173) ($210) ($304) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,704 -$6,627 -$7,375 -$4,704 -$6,627 -$7,375 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $579*** $46 -$386 $557*** $24 -$408* 
($192) ($196) ($239) ($191) ($196) ($238) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,834 -$6,354 -$5,944 -$4,834 -$6,354 -$5,944 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $578*** -$69 -$269 $551*** -$96 -$299 
($206) ($193) ($323) ($204) ($193) ($323) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,791 -$5,858 -$5,731 -$4,791 -$5,858 -$5,731 
 
Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers: (i) with at least five quarters of tenure; (ii) who are part of a company shut-down; (iii) who resided in 




the output from equation 4 , excluding the propensity score. Column (1) is λ1 λ2, Column (2) is λ1, and Column (3) is λ1 λ3. A linear and quadratic 
propensity score is included in the model. The dependent variable in the first stage is whether the displaced worker resided in the same state as the state of birth. 
The excluded instruments for that stage are state of birth and the number of children under six and under 18. This is estimated via a probit model. λsnall , λmedium 






Appendix Table 2.1: Evolution of Concentrated and Non-





# in 2004 Quarter 1 4,796 9,118 
% Concentrated in 2005 85% 7% 
% Concentrated in 2008 80% 9% 
 
Notes: The unit in this table is CBSA-industry combinations. The second row refers to the percent of CBSA-industries that were concentrated in 2005 given their 





Appendix Table 2.2: Demographic and Work History Characteristics of Job Stayers 
  All   Expansion   Recession 
  Concentrated 
Not 
Concentrated   Concentrated 
Not 





Hispanic 16% 16%   15% 16%   17% 17% 
White, Not 
Hispanic 68% 66%   69% 67%   67% 65% 
Black, Not 
Hispanic 9% 11%   9% 10%   9% 11% 
Asian, Not 
Hispanic 6% 6%   5% 5%   6% 6% 
Other, Not 
Hispanic 1% 1%   1% 1%   1% 1% 
Male 49% 45%   49% 45%   49% 45% 
Age 46 46   46 47   46 46 
  
Work History 
Experience 12.1 12.1  11.3 11.3  12.9 12.8 
Industry 
Experience 7.8 8.0  7.5 7.7  8.1 8.3 
Tenure 2.4 5.4  2.2 5.3  2.5 5.6 
Count 299,000 606,000  148,000 299,000  152,000 307,000 
Notes: The sample is the one percent sample of U.S. job stayers for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. These workers must 
have 17 quarters of tenure—four quarters before the quarter of interest, the quarter of interest, and 12 quarters after the quarter of interest. Experience is defined 




positive earnings in the same industry as his pre-displacement industry. Tenure is defined as the total number of consecutive quarters at the firm he was displaced 




Appendix Table 2.3: Firm and CBSA Characteristics of Job Stayers 
  All   Expansion   Recession 
  Concentrated
Not 
Concentrated   Concentrated 
Not 




Firm Size, Firm Age Characteristics 
Firm size >  499 53% 59%   52% 58%   54% 59% 
Firm age > 3yrs 96% 97%   96% 97%   96% 97% 
  
Supersector Characteristics 
Construction 5% 4%   5% 4%   4% 3% 
Manufacturing 11% 13%   11% 13%   11% 12% 
Trade, Transportation, 
and Utilities 20% 21%   19% 20%   20% 21% 
Information 3% 2%   3% 2%   4% 2% 
Financial Activities 12% 3%   12% 3%   12% 3% 
Professional and 
business services 21% 3%   21% 3%   22% 3% 
Education and health 
services 13% 36%   13% 36%   13% 36% 
Leisure and hospitality 4% 7%   4% 7%   4% 7% 
Other 11% 13%   11% 13%   11% 12% 
  
CBSA Characteristics 
Total People 3.5 Million 4.0 Million   3.4 Million 4.0 Million   3.5 Million 4.0 Million 





Notes: The sample is the one percent sample of U.S. job stayers for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. These workers must 
have 17 quarters of tenure—four quarters before the quarter of interest, the quarter of interest, and 12 quarters after the quarter of interest. Firm size, firm age, 
and supersector are determined by the worker’s firm. Average CBSA population size is determined by first attributing the CBSA of residency to each agent at the 
time of displacement, then determining the population size of the CBSA during that time, and then taking the sample average of the population size across all 




Appendix Table 2.4: The Effects of Concentrated 
Industries on Change in Earnings (Prior to Displacement) 
λExpansion λRecession 
ΔY8 hf-yrs before, 7 hf-yrs before, PE -$28 -$46 
($63) ($69) 
ΔY7 hf-yrs before, 6 hf-yrs before, PE -$55 $61 
($64) ($71) 
ΔY6 hf-yrs before, 5 hf-yrs before, PE -$10 -$221***
($65) ($58) 
ΔY5 hf-yrs before, 4 hf-yrs before, PE $4 $190*** 
($66) ($57) 
ΔY4 hf-yrs before, 3 hf-yrs before, PE $35 -$43 
($72) ($53) 
ΔY3 hf-yrs before, 2 hf-yrs before, PE $72 $119** 
($67) ($56) 
ΔY2 hf-yrs before, 1 hf-yrs before, PE -$83 -$127***
($57) ($49) 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. The dependent variable is 
change in earnings. This is the output from equation 1 , using earnings change prior to job loss as the dependent variable. The first two rows report the point 
estimate and standard error for the earnings change seven half-years before displacement relative to eight half-years; the next two rows report the point estimate 





Appendix Table 2.5: The Effects of Concentrated Industries (Removing 
Recalls) 
  λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $442*** -$105 
($126) ($140) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$7,082 -$9,917 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $397*** $2 
($107) ($129) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,302 -$8,645 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $443*** $98 
($112) ($139) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,139 -$8,310 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $389*** $87 
($103) ($136) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,829 -$7,736 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $507*** $119 
($115) ($130) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,162 -$7,365 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $450*** $59 
($115) ($122) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,145 -$6,870 
Notes: The sample is the same as Table 2.3, but displaced workers who were recalled to their original jobs are removed from the sample. These are workers 





Appendix Table 2.6: The Effects of Concentrated Industries (Same 
Firm Restriction) 
  λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $525*** -$1 
($190) ($179) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$7,421 -$10,232 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $596*** $52 
($160) ($158) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,700 -$8,232 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $584*** $27 
($167) ($171) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,784 -$7,898 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $694*** $18 
($154) ($168) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,327 -$7,319 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $809*** -$30 
($173) ($164) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,959 -$7,020 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $703*** -$139 
($172) ($158) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,762 -$6,503 
Notes: The sample is the same as Table 2.3, but displaced workers are restricted to those from firms with at least one job stayer in his firm during that quarter. 





Appendix Table 2.7: The Effects of Concentrated Industries (Only 
Low Values for Concentrated Status) 
  λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $153 $230 
($220) ($228) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$8,037 -$10,464 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $479*** $186 
($180) ($197) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,082 -$8,137 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $630*** $321 
($188) ($189) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,212 -$8,110 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $526*** $125 
($159) ($174) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,605 -$7,282 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $750*** $133 
($178) ($159) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,239 -$7,251 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $646*** -$1 
($150) ($151) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,905 -$6,485 
 
Notes: The sample is the same as Table 2.3, except displaced workers and job stayers are taken out of the sample if: (i) they are in a concentrated industry; and 





Appendix Table 2.8: The Effects of Concentrated Industries by Percentile 
Expansion Recession 
  λ25-50  λ50-75  λ75+  λ25-50  λ50-75  λ75+  
0-6 Months After Job Loss $948*** $1,079*** $1,434*** -$428** -$1,198*** -$943*** 
($238) ($207) ($185) ($185) ($214) ($181) 
6-12 Months After Job 
Loss $968*** $1,355*** $1,565*** -$896*** -$1,433*** -$1,293*** 
($162) ($144) ($135) ($141) ($175) ($135) 
12-18 Months After Job 
Loss $1,081*** $1,609*** $1,806*** -$772*** -$1,293*** -$944*** 
($188) ($132) ($131) ($130) ($165) ($128) 
18-24 Months After Job 
Loss $1,016*** $1,384*** $1,590*** -$733*** -$1,206*** -$961*** 
($140) ($135) ($127) ($126) ($182) ($126) 
24-30 Months After Job 
Loss $791*** $1,198*** $1,513*** -$356*** -$811*** -$477*** 
($181) ($138) ($139) ($133) ($160) ($134) 
30-36 Months After Job 
Loss $442*** $711*** $1,022*** -$276** -$607*** -$457*** 
($164) ($132) ($127) ($120) ($150) ($125) 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. λ25-50 compares the 25th-50th 
percentile in the distribution of local employment share across CBSAs in an industry relative to the below 25th percentile range; λ50-75 compares the 50th-75th 





Appendix Table 2.9: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on 
Migration 
  λExpansion λRecession 
1 Year After Job Loss -0.0081*** -0.0009 
 (0.0017) (0.0011) 
2 Years After Job Loss -0.0078*** -0.0024 
 (0.0020) (0.0015) 
3 Years After Job Loss -0.0073*** -0.0025 
 (0.0021) (0.0017) 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. The outcome is whether the 






Appendix Table 2.10: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change in Earnings by Age 
  25-35 Year Olds 35-45 Year Olds 45+ Year Olds 
  λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $548*** -$196 $529*** -$62 $361** $10 
($143) ($142) ($151) ($171) ($149) ($154) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$6,829 -$9,155 -$7,796 -$10,621 -$8,491 -$11,195
6-12 Months After Job Loss $420*** -$109 $476*** -$146 $297** -$52 
($120) ($124) ($125) ($147) ($125) ($135) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,585 -$7,253 -$5,123 -$8,430 -$5,493 -$8,956 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $536*** $53 $575*** $128 $420*** $125 
($135) ($136) ($136) ($169) ($129) ($147) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,788 -$7,153 -$5,255 -$8,324 -$5,615 -$8,884 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $343*** -$13 $536*** $22 $365*** $53 
($129) ($137) ($122) ($165) ($121) ($141) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,406 -$6,554 -$4,795 -$7,608 -$5,093 -$8,112 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $493*** $40 $764*** $189 $503*** $145 
($147) ($135) ($143) ($162) ($133) ($140) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,978 -$6,518 -$5,410 -$7,504 -$5,735 -$8,026 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $441*** -$109 $623*** -$53 $382*** $76 
($147) ($128) ($145) ($145) ($131) ($131) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,796 -$5,927 -$5,224 -$6,860 -$5,523 -$7,338 
Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2004 
to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any quarter from 
2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter.  The dependent variable is change in 




Appendix Table 2.11: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change in Earnings by 
Educational Attainment 
  Education: Low Education: High  
  λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $338*** $27 $999*** -$315 
($126) ($138) ($196) ($202) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$7,472 -$10,049 -$8,646 -$11,664 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $240** -$4 $1,022*** -$406** 
($102) ($119) ($174) ($176) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,929 -$8,032 -$5,205 -$8,888 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $343*** $180 $1,202*** -$146 
($112) ($139) ($176) ($171) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,996 -$7,916 -$5,378 -$8,754 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $313*** $123 $942*** -$316* 
($101) ($132) ($166) ($176) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,549 -$7,203 -$4,653 -$7,874 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $468*** $224* $1,095*** -$146 
($119) ($130) ($177) ($169) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,070 -$7,067 -$5,382 -$7,865 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $396*** $105 $854*** -$315* 
($116) ($115) ($184) ($169) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,900 -$6,426 -$4,943 -$6,994 
 
Note: The displaced worker sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the 
LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any 
quarter from 2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. The dependent variable is 
change in earnings. The estimates are the output from equation 1 , limited to those with either low education (less than a Bachelor’s degree) or high education 





Appendix Table 2.12: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Employment by Educational Attainment 
  Employment Same-Industry 
  Education: Low Education: High  Education: Low Education: High  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss 0.018*** -0.009** 0.029*** -0.011** 0.035*** 0.006 0.032*** -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unconditional Employment 0.754 0.638 0.757 0.663 0.423 0.361 0.466 0.400 
6-12 Months After Job Loss 0.016*** -0.004 0.030*** -0.005 0.036*** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.011 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unconditional Employment 0.810 0.690 0.814 0.715 0.423 0.366 0.475 0.409 
12-18 Months After Job Loss 0.016*** 0.000 0.028*** 0.001 0.035*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.013** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unconditional Employment 0.808 0.703 0.816 0.729 0.389 0.342 0.449 0.391 
18-24 Months After Job Loss 0.016*** 0.003 0.022*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.015** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unconditional Employment 0.805 0.722 0.814 0.743 0.370 0.333 0.431 0.381 
24-30 Months After Job Loss 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.023*** 0.007** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.033*** 0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unconditional Employment 0.789 0.734 0.803 0.751 0.345 0.320 0.410 0.368 
30-36 Months After Job Loss 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unconditional Employment 0.771 0.740 0.789 0.756 0.329 0.312 0.395 0.360 
 
Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 
to 2012. The dependent variable is any employment in Columns (1)-(4), and same industry employment in Columns (5)-(8). Columns (1)-(2) are the λExpansion 




(6) are the λExpansion and λRecession within-industry employment estimates for those with low education, and Columns (7)-(8) are the analogous statistics for 






Appendix Table 2.13: The Number of Co-workers 
Voluntarily Separating, by Concentrated Industry Status 
  λExpansion λRecession 
Point Estimate 59 -5 
STD Error 73 25 
Unconditional Average 432 309 
 
Notes: The sample is the full set of U.S. displaced workers with at least five quarters of tenure for states that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 
to 2012. The job stayer sample is a one percent sample of workers who met the following criteria: (i) They had five quarters of tenure as of any quarter from 
2005 to 2012; (ii) They then proceeded to have 12 consecutive quarters of tenure at the same firm after that quarter. The dependent variable is the number of 
displaced workers’ co-workers with adjacent or within quarter dominant job-to-job flow prior to job loss. The covariates are the same as those in equation 3 , 





Appendix Table 2.14: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change in Earnings (Within Plant Closers, 
Birth State Residence) 
 
Plant Closers 
Plant Closers and Reside Within the Same 
State as Birth State 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
λExpansion λRecession λExpansion λRecession 
0-6 Months After Job Loss $359* -$202 $287 -$198 
($203) ($197) ($224) ($215) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$8,037 -$10,741 -$8,084 -$10,739 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $399** -$111 $291 -$151 
($177) ($187) ($202) ($202) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,960 -$8,792 -$4,933 -$8,817 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $396** $54 $217 $1 
($181) ($203) ($200) ($220) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,361 -$8,165 -$4,276 -$8,189 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $351** $78 $223 $15 
($166) ($185) ($180) ($200) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,121 -$7,453 -$4,031 -$7,420 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $346** $164 $249 $141 
($169) ($170) ($186) ($182) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,202 -$6,899 -$4,122 -$6,846 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $227 $186 $132 $173 
($168) ($181) ($182) ($201) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,366 -$6,357 -$4,273 -$6,260 
Notes: Columns (1)-(2) include the following sample: the full set of U.S. displaced workers: (i) with at least five quarters of tenure; (ii) who were part of a 
company shut-down; (iii) who resided in a state that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. Columns (3)-(4) include the following sample: 
the full set of U.S. displaced workers: (i) with at least five quarters of tenure; (ii) who were part of a company shut-down; (iii) who resided in the same state as 





Appendix Table 2.15: The Effects of Concentrated Industries on Change in Earnings by the Severity of Local Shocks (Within Plant 
Closers, Birth State Residence) 
  Plant Closers  Plant closers and reside within the same state 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  λsmall  λmedium λlarge  λsmall  λmedium λlarge  
0-6 Months After Job Loss $630** -$214 -$709** $594** -$256 -$698*** 
($248) ($204) ($273) ($269) ($235) ($279) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$8,451 -$9,822 -$12,021 -$8,516 -$9,752 -$12,003 
6-12 Months After Job Loss $592*** -$64 -$558** $552*** -$180 -$583** 
($169) ($214) ($264) ($181) ($236) ($298) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,408 -$7,815 -$10,070 -$5,347 -$7,785 -$10,053 
12-18 Months After Job Loss $728*** $39 -$592** $603*** -$82 -$654* 
($174) ($210) ($293) ($186) ($232) ($346) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$5,104 -$7,397 -$8,109 -$4,993 -$7,365 -$8,032 
18-24 Months After Job Loss $589*** $62 -$369 $519*** -$72 -$448 
($164) ($194) ($264) ($174) ($210) ($306) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,820 -$6,696 -$7,509 -$4,704 -$6,627 -$7,375 
24-30 Months After Job Loss $617*** $150 -$344 $579*** $46 -$386 
($177) ($181) ($211) ($192) ($196) ($239) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,945 -$6,410 -$6,144 -$4,834 -$6,354 -$5,944 
30-36 Months After Job Loss $595*** $38 -$222 $578*** -$69 -$269 
($186) ($174) ($274) ($206) ($193) ($323) 
Unconditional Earnings Losses -$4,896 -$5,943 -$5,991 -$4,791 -$5,858 -$5,731 
 
Notes: Columns (1)-(2) include the following sample: the full set of U.S. displaced workers: (i) with at least five quarters of tenure; (ii) who were part of a 
company shut-down; (iii) who resided in a state that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. Columns (3)-(4) include the following sample: 




the state of birth during job loss; (iv) who resided in a state that submitted worker earnings to the LEHD from 2005 to 2012. The Bartik Instrument is used to 





Chapter 3: The Consequences of Job Loss in the Great 
Recession 
  
 (Co-Authored with Henry Hyatt and Erika McEntarfer) 
3.1 Introduction 
The U.S. Labor market is recovering from the deepest employment downturn 
since the end of World War II. Millions of workers lost their jobs during the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009, with employment losses occurring across several broad 
sectors of the economy. Previous studies have shown that job losers receive much 
lower earnings (if any) after job loss during a recession, but we still do not know why 
these “earnings losses” are more severe during these downturns. Recent work (Fallick 
et al 2012) suggests that longer non-employment duration within the Great Recession 
is primarily responsible for worse earnings losses during this period relative to 
expansions, but we do not know if this relationship still holds when comparing it to 
less severe recessions. 
In this chapter, we use the rich longitudinal data from the Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) to first calculate how displaced workers’ 
earnings losses, as proxied by earnings changes, vary across recent recessions and 
expansions. We find that displaced workers who lost their jobs between 2008 and 
2012, which includes the Great Recession, had roughly 9% more severe earnings 
losses relative to those who lost their job during the 2001 Recession. We also find 
that displaced workers who lost their jobs during an expansion had 17% -31% less 




We then attribute how much of the variation in earnings losses across these 
different time periods can be explained by the variation in non-employment length, 
quality of job match in subsequent employment (if applicable), and the interaction 
between these two outcomes. We find that non-employment length differences across 
time explain a very high share of the variation in earnings losses across the Great 
Recession, the 2001 Recession, and recent expansions. The quality of job match, as 
approximated by whether the displaced worker found employment within the same 
supersector as his previous firm, explains a sizeable portion as well, but not as high as 
the non-employment length.40 We also find that the interaction between these two 
outcomes explains a very high share of the earnings loss variation across time. We 
interpret these results as evidence that not only are there less jobs available during a 
recession, but the quality of available jobs are also lower. We thus conclude that both 
factors contribute to higher earnings losses for job losers during a recession.  
We estimate the effects of job displacement by comparing the earnings 
changes for displaced workers relative to workers who did not lose their job (job 
stayers) within each of the time periods (i.e. within the Great Recession, 2001 
Recession, etc). We calculate an effect for each quarter for three years after job loss, 
to see not only how displaced workers are affected initially, but also to evaluate how 
persistent job loss effects are. We then calculate a net present discounted value of 
earnings losses within each time period, and then perform a shift share analysis to see 
whether other outcomes or demographic characteristics can explain the variation in 
earnings losses across time. 
                                                 
40 Supersector is a BLS defined term for the groupings of NAICS sectors. The mapping from NAICS 




There is evidence within the literature that indicates macroeconomic 
conditions can affect the earnings losses for displaced workers by looking across 
business cycles. The evidence of the persistence in earnings losses from displacement 
during the 1982 recession was brought to light from Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 
(1993) and von Wachter, Manchester, and Song (2008), who show that earnings 
losses persist for more than six years and more than a decade, respectively. Couch 
and Placzek (2010) show similar persistence patterns in earnings losses by looking at 
displaced workers from another recession, the 2001 recession. The most striking 
evidence of potential variation across time comes from Farber (2011), where he 
shows that there are clear cyclical patterns in job loss rate (countercyclical) and the 
re-employment rate (pro-cyclical). The lack of job opportunities during and after 
these recessions naturally amplified and increased the persistence of earnings losses. 
We are also interested in how the subsequent job match quality after job loss 
can affect displaced workers’ earnings across time. If a worker has to learn a new set 
of skills at his new job he will not be as productive and therefore will earn less . Since 
workers are less likely to find jobs that suit their skills during a recession, it is likely 
that variation in job match quality contributes to variation in earnings losses across 
business cycle phases. 
We then conclude our findings by analyzing how unemployment benefits 
mitigate earnings losses for displaced workers during worse economic conditions. We 
find that although unemployment compensation rises during worse conditions, this 




during the Great Recession. We do find, however, that they compensate for losses 
experienced in less severe recessions. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: The next section provides the data 
description; section 3 provides the methodology; section 4 describes the results, and 




We use the Longitudinal Employer-Houshold Dynamics (LEHD) data as the 
primary database within this analysis. The LEHD is an employer-employee linked 
longitudinal database that contains quarterly information for most US worker-
establishment combinations.41 We are also able to track an employee’s job spell for a 
given establishment over time, since attrition is of little concern in this administrative 
database. An additional feature of the LEHD is that we are able to observe the 
worker’s demographic characteristics such as age and gender, both of which we use 
as control variables for our main empirical analysis. 42  
The main relation we analyze is how displaced workers’ earnings evolved 
relative to those who never lost their job (i.e. job stayers) within recent expansions 
and recessions. We aggregate the worker’s earnings across all jobs within a quarter, 
                                                 
41 We observe the earnings and employment for all of the workers who were ever employed within the 
United States. The exception is employment for the federal government and the self-employed. 
Additionally, we are not able to observe hours with this database. 




and evaluate the earnings evolution within a six year window, starting from three 
years before job loss, and ending three years after. 43  
Since we are unable to directly identify displaced workers within the LEHD, 
we use an approximation that is similar to other approximations used within the 
displaced worker literature. We first restrict our sample of displaced worker 
candidates to all workers who had a minimum of twelve quarters of tenure, since we 
are interested in the earnings outcomes for workers who lost their jobs after initially 
having an extended period of stable employment. Fortunately we are able to calculate 
the duration of job tenure for each worker within the data, as well as identify which 
establishment pays the worker the most, which we will refer to as the “dominant job”. 
We then further restrict our candidates to those who had a dominant job separation 
(i.e. when the job is no longer their dominant job) in a given quarter.44 Finally, to 
approximate that this separation is due to an involuntary job loss due to a mass-layoff, 
we exploit the firm dynamics information that is available in the LEHD for these 
workers. If the worker’s establishment has at least a thirty percent decrease during the 
same quarter as his separation quarter, we flag him as a displaced worker.45 
                                                 
43 Results for a future draft (not currently shown) extend the number of quarters of tenure and over 
which losses are calculated to eight. 
44 We use a prototype job-to-job flows database to identify separations. This database employs 
definitions similar to Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012a, 2012b), and which is also used by Haltiwanger, 
Hyatt, and McEntarfer (2014). 
45 30% is an approximation for a mass-layoff incidence. This threshold is determined by the maximum 
establishment employment count for the two quarters prior to a quarter of interested and the minimum 
establishment employment count for the two quarters after. For example, if the establishment had 100, 
99 employees during 2005 Q1, Q2, and 30, 25 employees during 2005 Q4, 2006 Q1, then it had a (25-
100)/100 = 75% reduction, and therefore a mass-layoff during 2005 Q3. In reality this type of 
separation can be the result of a voluntary job-to-job flow, termination due to cause, or an involuntary 
job loss. We provide evidence that, while it is certainly possible some of these workers are incorrectly 
labelled as people who lost their job due to a mass-layoff, on average we capture these workers with 
this definition. Other papers have used similar measures to flag displaced workers, but use years 
instead of quarters to calculate the percentage decline of a firm (Jacobsen Lalonde and Sullivan (1993), 




Our sample of job stayers is intended to be a comparable group of workers to 
our sample of displaced workers. We first restrict all workers to have the same 
minimum tenure restriction at a quarter, just like our displaced worker sample.46 We 
also require these workers to have an additional three years of tenure after the quarter, 
to approximate what the displaced workers’ earnings would have been in the absence 
of job loss. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Our main empirical question is how much of the earnings loss variation across 
time is explained by non-employment length variation, and how much is due to poor 
subsequent job matches. We are unable to distinguish between non-employment and 
unemployment, because we are unable to identify workers who drop out of the labor 
force. This data shortcoming is not a problem for our analysis, since we want to 
include workers who were discouraged from the labor market.47 We follow the 
methodology used within Fallick, McEntarfer, Haltiwanger (2012) to calculate the ex-
post non-employment, where we use the count of full quarter non-employment.48  
We approximate a poor subsequent job match by whether the displaced 
worker works for a firm that is part of a different supersector than his previous job’s. 
                                                 
46 For example, for 2005 quarter 1, the worker needs to be employed at the same firm for every quarter 
from 2002 quarter 1 to 2005 quarter 1. 
47 The shortcoming associated with zero earnings is that we are currently not including all of the states 
within our sample because different states started to submit their earnings during different years. We 
therefore restrict the sample to workers who worked within the states that had started to submit their 
information prior to 1996, inclusive. The consequence of this is that zero earnings could be due to the 
worker moving to a state not within our sample. We have done alternative runs where we include these 
other states earnings for our cohort, and we do not see noticeable differences. 
48 One consequence from this method is we are unable to identify workers who experience short-term 




If a worker works for a firm outside his original supersector after job loss, it could be 
because that job was a good match for somebody with his skillset. However, it is also 
possible that he works there because he has no job offers that are a good match for 
him, and this was the best job available. The latter scenario is more likely to arise if 
the worker is liquidity constrained, which will occur if he has an extended non-
employment length, which is more likely to occur in a severe economic downturn. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the interaction of non-employment length 
interacts and job match quality affects earnings loss variation over time. 
We then evaluate to what extent these earnings losses were mitigated by 
unemployment benefits. We link the LEHD with the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) March Supplement to get the unemployment benefit information for workers 
that are in both databases. By using this sample, we are able to infer whether existing 
policies have provided enough assistance during recessions. 
 
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
We evaluate earnings losses within five periods: 1998 quarter 2 – 2001 quarter 
1; 2001 quarter 2 – 2001 quarter 4 (the 2001 recession); 2002 quarter 1 – 2007 quarter 
3; 2007 quarter 4 – 2009 quarter 2 (the Great Recession); and 2009 quarter 3 – 2010 
quarter 2. We choose to partition in this manner so that we evaluate the effects from 
job loss during severe downturns (Great Recession, 2001 Recession, 2009 quarter 3 – 
2010 quarter 2), economic recoveries (2002 quarter 1 – 2007 quarter 3), and 




For each quarter within each of the five periods, we first classify a worker that 
meets the tenure restriction as either a displaced worker or a job stayer. We then 
compute the worker’s earnings for each quarter within the following time window: 12 
quarters before, the quarter of interest, and 12 quarters after, giving us 25 quarters 
total. We then combine all displaced workers and job stayers across all quarters 
within a period, and subset the data to men 35-55 years old. We label each quarter 
within a period as , and we label each quarter within its time window as . To give 
an example, within the 2001 Recession period, ’s values are: 2001 quarter 2, 2001 
quarter 3 and 2001 quarter 4. The workers within this period are displaced workers 
and job stayers from any of these three quarters. Since we are looking at a 25 quarter 
time window for each of these three  quarters, ’s values within the 2001 Recession 
will range from 1998 quarter 2 (12 quarters before 2001 quarter 2, the first  in this 
period) to 2004 quarter 4 (12 quarters after 2001 quarter 4, the last  in this period).  
Our main empirical equation, which we estimate for each of the 5 periods 
separately, is the following: 
∗ 			 1  
 represents total earnings for worker  within a quarter . The  term 
controls for heterogeneity associated with what q the worker was included in the 
sample (which will be the quarter of job loss for displaced workers, and quarter of 
inclusion for job stayers). The  term represents the quarter of the observation, which 
control for aggregate effects. We also include age and age squared to control for 




We focus largely on how the  estimates evolve across time, especially when 
0. These estimates are defined by how high earnings are for displaced workers 
(i.e. 1) relative to job stayers (i.e. 0) when the observation 
during quarter  is  quarters away from the job loss quarter  relative to a left out 
quarter, which we will discuss shortly. Negative values of  represent observations 
that occur  quarters before job loss, positive values represent observations that occur 
 quarters after job loss, and 0 is the quarter of job loss. For example, if the 
observation is 2005 quarter 3, and the displaced worker loses his job in 2004 quarter 
3/worker is a job stayer around 2004 quarter 3, then 4. If the observation is 2004 
quarter 1, then 2. Since we analyze how earnings evolve 12 quarters before to 
12 quarters after job loss within our baseline specification, we set 11 and 
12, making 12 quarters prior to job loss as the left out category.  
We expect the , 0 terms to be negative, since displaced workers’ 
earnings changes after job loss are typically much lower than those who didn’t lose 
their jobs. We expect  to be the lowest (i.e. highest magnitude) for the first few 
positive  values, since a displaced worker is more likely to be out of work during the 
first few quarters after job loss as opposed to several years later. Most displaced 
worker studies show that earnings losses are persistent, so we expect , ,  to 
be negative as well to reflect this. 
In order to present an aggregate number for each of the 5 periods, we calculate 
a net present discounted value (net PDV) to provide an aggregate summary of 
earnings losses for displaced workers within a given period. We calculate this statistic 





										 2  
Where  represents one of the 5 periods, and the  term is the estimate from equation 
1 for that period. We use a discount rate  of 0.01 to weight earnings losses from 
earlier quarters more than later ones, to reflect possible present-discounted 
preferences. Our metric represents the weighted earnings losses for all  quarters 
after job loss, using the quarter before job loss as the base quarter (hence why we 
subtract the   term). We use the first quarter before displacement rather than 
earlier periods, since we do not want any variation in the earnings dip before 
displacement to affect our interpretation (ex: if we were to use, say  as the base 
estimate and use , , , etc as the post periods, we will include the earnings 
changes prior to job loss. If the earnings dip prior to job loss is more severe during 
some time periods relative to others, this effect will be captured in the PDV statistic. 
We are not interested in capturing that effect in our net PDV, and instead we focus 
solely on the effects after job loss).49 
 We use a shift share analysis to calculate how non-employment length and 
subsequent job match quality variation explain earnings loss variation across each of 
the 5 periods. As stated earlier, we use re-employment at a different supersector as an 
approximation for poor subsequent match quality. Using the subscript  as the 
base period,  as the period of interest, and  as different values within an 
                                                 
49 We do not use the quarter of displacement as the base quarter either. This is due to the fact that we 
cannot observe when during the quarter the agent is displaced, and if there is any variation across time 
quarters within a quarter when the agent is displaced, it could affect our results. The occurrence of 




explanatory variable of interest, we decompose the changes in the net PDV across 
periods as: 
Δ . .Δ 				 3  
The left hand side of (3) is the unconditional change of the net PDV across 
two periods. The ΔPDV  represents the change in the net 
present discounted value across periods within category .50 The . term 
represents the average values between the two periods within category  (i.e. 
).  is the share of the people within category , and the Δ  and 
. terms are the equivalent statistics for the share of people. 
The right hand side of equation 3 is composed of two parts: The “within 
effect” and the “composition effect”. The first term is the “within effect”, which 
shows how much of the unconditional PDV change is due to PDV changes within 
each category across the two periods. The second term is the “composition effect”, 
which shows how much of the unconditional PDV change is due to changes in the 
category shares across the two periods. We focus on the second term, since we are 
interested in whether any changes in the prevalence of certain outcomes (i.e. changes 
in the share of displaced workers with poor subsequent fit, changes in the share of 
displaced workers with high non-employment length) can explain earnings loss 
variation. Although we focus mostly on the non-employment length and job match 
                                                 
50 To calculate the net PDV within category , we restrict the displaced worker sample to those within 




quality, we also investigate how compositional changes in age, education, and race-
ethnicity influence earnings loss variation across periods.51 
One of the assumptions within our empirical model is that the earnings trends 
for job stayers are comparable across each of the five periods, i.e. we assume that 
estimated differences across periods is due to variation in the displaced workers’ 
earnings and not the job stayers. There are many reasons why our assumption is 
appropriate. If we assume that displacement is exogenous across time, these effects 
should also be comparable across time. In addition, if unobserved differences 
between displaced workers and job stayers are determined by time-invariant 
characteristics, and these characteristics differ across periods, our inclusion of fixed 
effects will control for these differences. 
  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Worker and Firm Characteristics 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide demographic and establishment characteristics for 
the workers within our sample. There are several differences in characteristics 
between displaced workers and job stayers within each of the five periods, and some 
of these differences are larger for some periods relative to others. Displaced workers 
are on average younger, less educated, and have a smaller percentage of white 
workers relative to job stayers, suggesting that there are also differences in 
                                                 
51 Education is not observed for all of the agents within the sample. The LEHD does impute the 





unobservable characteristics between the two types of workers.52 We also see that 
displaced workers’ supersector composition is different from the job stayers’.53 
Displaced workers have higher representation within the construction, manufacturing, 
leisure/hospitality and professional/business services supersectors, while job stayers 
have higher representation within the education/health service, and 
trade/transportation supersectors, again suggesting differences between the two types 
of workers. These differences strongly suggest that displacement is not exogenous, 
but this will only be a concern if effects from “selection” into job loss varies across 
the five periods. These effects will likely vary, but in a way that will be favorable for 
our interpretation. Firms are likely to let go of their least productive workers during a 
mass layoff, but they are less likely to be as selective during a recession as evidenced 
by the higher incidence of plant closures (i.e. when they let go of all their workers). If 
displaced workers are less productive, then any OLS bias will be negative (i.e. less 
productive workers are less likely to be re-employed, and OLS estimates will capture 
this phenomenon), but they will likely be more negative during our expansion 
periods. Since we expect recessions to have more negative earnings losses, and OLS 
biases are more negative during expansions, selection effects are not a problem for 
our analysis. 
There is considerable variation in the displaced workers’ supersector 
composition across each of the five periods, especially when comparing it to job 
stayers. Relative to job stayers, displaced workers were more likely to come from the 
                                                 
52 This assumes that differences in demographic characteristics is a proxy for differences in 
unobservable characteristics.  
53 Firm size is also noticeably smaller for displaced workers relative to job stayers. However, this is 




construction sector over time, with a 4.3 percentage point (pp) difference before the 
2001 recession (10.3%-6%) to a 17.6 pp difference after the Great Recession (24.0%-
6.4%). There is also a noticeable difference in the displaced worker representation 
relative to job stayers within the manufacturing sector. The difference in prevalence 
between the two worker categories is more severe during recessions, since there is 
roughly a 9 pp difference during the Great Recession and the 2001 Recession (30.1%-
21.3%, 34.3%-25.6%, respectively), while there is only roughly a 2.5 pp difference 
within our expansion periods (28.4%-25.8% for the 1999-2001 qtr 1 expansion, 
26.3%-23.5% 2002 qtr 1-2007 qtr 3, 23.3%-20.8% for 2009 qtr 3-2010 qtr 2). Also, 
job stayers have a higher representation within the Trade, Transportation, and 
Utilities supersector over time; they have a 3 pp higher prevalence before the 2001 
recession (23%-19.8%), which increases to an 8 pp higher prevalence at the end of 
the time series (24.0%-15.8%). These changes across periods suggest that initial 
supersector of employment may also affect subsequent earnings for displaced workers 
relative to job stayers. As a result, we include this as one of the categories for our 
shift share analysis. 
 
 
3.4.2 Baseline Regressions 
Figure 3.1 has the national displacement rates across our time series.54 Figure 
3.1 shows that displaced workers are more likely to lose their job during a recession, 
especially during the Great Recession. The Great Recession’s peak is more than 57% 
                                                 
54 The denominator within the time series is the count of dominant jobs within that quarter, which are 




higher than any other peak, which reflects the deteriorating labor market condition in 
that period. The expansion period following the Great Recession also had 
displacement rates that were higher than the 2001 Recession and the other expansion 
periods in our time series, which again shows how poor the economic recovery was 
during those years. The third highest peak occurs during the 2001 Recession, which is 
then followed by the 2002-2007 expansion and the pre-2001 expansion. If earnings 
losses are commensurate with national job loss rates, we should expect to find that the 
Great Recession has the highest earnings losses, followed by its “recovery” period, 
then the 2001 Recession, then the 2002-2007 expansion, and then the pre-2001 
Recession expansion period. 
We find that earnings losses move in a very similar pattern to the 
displacement rates, as evidenced by Figure 3.2 and Appendix Table 3.1. The net PDV 
for the Great Recession is the largest at roughly 60,020 dollars over a 12 quarter 
period, followed closely by the recovery period after the Great Recession (58,150), 
the 2001 Recession (54,844), the expansion period during 2002-2007 (50,829), and 
the expansion period before the 2001 Recession (43,587).  
One reason why the net PDV is so large during the Great Recession is due to 
the large initial earnings dip that occurs during this period, as shown by the ,  
estimates. The dip is large for each of the five periods, but is largest for the Great 
Recession and the recovery period after the Great Recession, contributing to a high 
net PDV value. The smallest dip occurs during the expansion period prior to the 2001 
Recession, and there are small differences in the dip magnitude between the 2001 




A similar ranking across periods appears when looking at earnings loss 
persistence (i.e. the , 2 estimates). Earnings losses are persistent for all of the 
periods, as evidenced by the negative  estimate (which means displaced workers’ 
earnings changes is substantially lower than job stayers even 12 quarters after job 
loss), but once again the Great Recession has the most severe losses. The  estimate 
is very similar in magnitude for the other periods in our sample, but we see that the 
expansion period before the 2001 Recession has the least severe persistence, followed 
by the 2002-2007 expansion period. The 2001 Recession and the recovery period 
after the Great Recession have almost identical  estimates, and are both roughly 
500 dollars more severe than equivalent estimate in the 2002-2007 expansion period.  
The most interesting pattern found in Figure 3.2/Appendix Table 3.1 is that 
even though the recovery period after the Great Recession has one of the most severe 
dips in earnings, it also has the biggest growth in the estimates across the three years. 
For this period, the  estimate is -$9,089, but the  estimate is -$4,933, implying 
that displaced workers’ earnings improved by roughly $4,100 between their first and 
their twelfth quarter after job loss. None of the other periods have as large of an 
improvement in earnings losses, especially 6 quarters after job loss (relative to the 
first quarter after job loss). This pattern suggests that the high net PDV for the 
“recovery” period after the Great Recession is driven primarily by the high initial dip 
in earnings and the slow recovery during the first year and a half after job loss for this 
period. Given that there is considerable variation in earnings losses within the three 
year span after job loss, a natural question follow up question is how much variation 




To explore how much heterogeneity is within each of the five periods, we re-
estimate equations (1) and (2) for each quarter of analysis, rather than pooling our 
results within five periods. Figure 3.3 has the time series of the net PDV, which 
shows that there is considerable heterogeneity within two of our periods. Within the 
2002-2007 expansion, the net PDV is substantially lower for people who lost their job 
during 2004-2006 relative to those who lost their job during 2002-2003. This pattern 
reinforces the idea that the economy experienced a “jobless recovery” for the first two 
years after the 2001 Recession, and jobs did not recover until a few years after the 
recession was declared to be over. There is also considerable variation within the 
Great Recession, and the net PDV is the highest for 2008 quarter 4. This quarter also 
has one of the highest displacement rates within Figure 3.1, and is roughly the time 
when the Dow fell by roughly 800 points. This event, coupled with the persistent 
climb in the unemployment rate for the next two years are likely to be big reasons 
why earnings losses were so high for workers who lost their job during the Great 
Recession. We do not see much heterogeneity within the 2001 Recession nor the 
period after the Great Recession, and the heterogeneity within the expansion prior to 
the 2001 Recession is most likely due to the economy approaching a recession 
towards the end of 2000. 
  
3.4.3 Non-employment and Job Quality 
Figure 3.4 provides suggestive evidence that non-employment length 
contributes to the earnings loss variation across the five periods. Figure 3.4 shows the 




1-4 quarters, 5-8 quarters, and at least 9 quarters of non-employment. The share of 
displaced workers with zero quarters of non-employment is pro-cyclical, and has a 
very large decrease during the Great Recession, implying that the share of these 
workers with any non-employment increases substantially during that period. In 
addition, the share of workers with long term non-employment (i.e. more than five 
quarters of non-employment) have a very large increase during the Great Recession. 
The share of displaced workers with long term non-employment is 35 percent higher 
during the Great Recession relative to the 2001 Recession (comparing peak to peak), 
while the share of displaced workers with zero quarters of non-employment is 32 
percent lower (comparing trough to trough) across the same two periods. Given that 
non-employment lengths were so much longer during the Great Recession relative to 
other periods, it highly suggests that non-employment contributes a substantial 
amount to the earnings loss variation across time. 
To see how subsequent job match quality affects earnings losses, Figure 3.5 
shows the time series of the share of displaced workers who have poor job matches 
after job loss, as proxied by working at a different supersector. For this figure, we 
categorize displaced workers within three mutually exclusive categories: cross 
supersector switchers (workers who worked at a firm outside his previous firm’s 
supersector during any quarter for three years after job loss), within supersector 
workers (workers who never worked at a firm outside his previous firm’s supersector 
during any quarter for three years after job loss, and found employment after job 
loss), and people who were unable to find a job within twelve quarters after 




the time series, with a global maximum of 42% during the 2001 recession. There is 
mild pro-cyclicality in the share of within supersector workers, and mild counter-
cyclicality within the people who are never re-employed. When classifying displaced 
workers by these three categories, the initial thought is poor job match quality may 
not explain as much of the earnings loss variation as non-employment length. 
However, our way of classifying job match may hide some heterogeneity: Some 
workers could switch supersectors due to finding a good job at a firm within another 
supersector, and some workers could switch because they have exhausted all liquidity 
after extended nonemployment, and are simply picking the best or first job offer they 
find. One cannot reasonably expect both scenarios to have the same effects on 
earnings losses, so we look to see how non-employment interacts with job match 
quality.  
Figure 3.6 shows the time series of the interaction between supersector 
switching prevalence and non-employment length. There is strong pro-cyclicality for 
the within supersector workers with 0 quarters of non-employment, and strong 
counter-cyclicality for the supersector switchers with 1 or more quarters of non-
employment. The supersector switchers with 0 non-employment quarters and the 
within supersector workers with 1 or more quarters of non-employment time series do 
not exhibit cyclicality; the former has close to a monotonically decreasing time trend, 
and the latter time series has close to a monotonically increasing time trend. Most of 
the transitions across categories during a recession occur from supersector non-
switchers with 0 quarters of non-employment to the supersector switchers with one or 




workers are more likely to have bad job matches during a recession, since they are 
more likely to have extended non-employment (in this particular case, at least three 
months of non-employment), and if they find a job, it is more likely to be within a 
different supersector (i.e. a job where they will have to perform different functions 
from what they are used to). 
Table 3.3 provides a more explicit relation between earnings losses and these 
other outcomes. This table contains the shift share analysis described in equation (3), 
and some clear patterns emerge. The first is non-employment lengths play a very 
large role in determining earnings loss variation across time. Non-employment length 
determines anywhere from 34% of the earnings loss variation across time to more 
than 100% of the variation (which is possible with the way shift shares are 
calculated), suggesting it is a major component in explaining why earnings losses are 
so much larger during the Great Recession relative to other periods. The second 
pattern is that the prevalence of supersector switches explains a good portion of the 
earnings loss changes as well, ranging from 16-43% of the total changes. The largest 
effect, however, comes when analyzing how the interaction between supersector 
switching and non-employment length affects earnings loss variation. This interaction 
explains anywhere from 42% to more than 100% of the earnings loss variation. This 
increase in explanatory power suggests that non-employment and job match quality 
should not be treated as two separate entities, since workers with longer non-
employment duration are more likely to end up in a lower quality job after job loss. 
This relation could be the result of either a depreciation in human capital from not 




first job offer after running out of liquidity or unemployment benefits. As an 
additional test, we also perform the shift share calculation using different 
demographic characteristics to see if these can explain any of the earnings loss 
variation across time; None of them contribute nearly as much as non-employment or 
job match quality. 
 
3.4.4 Does Unemployment Insurance Mitigate Earnings Losses 
 During recessions, the federal government usually extends unemployment 
benefits in order to mitigate financial stress for the unemployed. We investigate to 
what extent benefit expansion helps displaced workers by incorporating 
unemployment insurance information provided by the CPS March Supplement 
database. We take our sample of displaced workers and job stayers within the LEHD 
and merge with the corresponding yearly CPS March Supplement survey.55 Figure 
3.7 presents the average yearly unemployment compensation for our displaced 
worker sample who is also in the CPS. Figure 3.7 shows that the unemployment 
compensation amount is higher during the periods with higher earnings losses.  
However, Figure 3.8 shows that this benefit increase is not enough to compensate for 
the earnings loss increase during the Great Recession. We still see high losses across 
periods even after adding the average unemployment benefits to the CPS average 
earnings losses, and we see that there is still considerable loss variation across time.56 
                                                 
55 The CPS year we use is determined based on the year the displaced worker lost his job / the year the 
job stayer is included within our sample.  
56 We define the CPS average earnings losses as the average earnings displaced workers had recorded 





Clearly earnings losses are higher for displaced workers within the Great 
Recession relative to the 2001 recession. We find that the differences within the 
earnings losses are explained more by longer non-employment durations rather than 
the subsequent poor matches, which we proxy with a supersector switch. However, 
we find that poor matches explain some of the variation in earnings losses. 
While this chapter provides a useful descriptive analysis on earnings losses 
across different business cycles, future work can analyze this question in a more 
rigorous manner. Rather than focusing on the supersector of the worker, occupation-
specific human capital has been shown to be a very important transferrable human 
capital component, and it would be useful to see how shocks that affect certain 
occupations affect workers who lose their jobs. In order to paint a more accurate 
picture of job match quality, future analysis should incorporate occupation, which is 
unfortunately not available in panel form within the LEHD. 
 Additionally, another way to expand upon this work is to see how an increase 
in displaced workers’ earnings losses possibly affects other workers and other 
outcomes labor economists are interested in. If these shocks that cause job loss are 
not temporary, would an increase in the prevalence of displaced workers cause a 
decrease in housing demand within an area, and if so, by how much? How would 
migration be affected by job loss, and how would this affect potential entrepreneurs 
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Figure 3.1: Displacement Rate Time Series 
 
 
Notes: A worker is defined as displaced if he has a) an observed separation from an establishment when the establishment has more 
than a 30% decrease in employment during the quarter of interest and b) at least twelve quarters of tenure from that establishment 
prior to displacement. The denominator is the number of dominant jobs in existence for that quarter. Dominant jobs are defined as the 
establishment that is associated with the highest earnings for a worker within a given time period. All time series are seasonally 






















































































































Figure 3.2: Conditional Earnings Evolution - Displaced Workers Relative to Job Stayers 
 
 
Note: The samples used were the displaced workers and job stayers during the respective periods. For example, the [1999 Q2, 2001 
Q1] sample has workers who were classified as either displaced workers or job stayers for any of the quarters from the second quarter 




















at the same establishment; 12 quarters before quarter t, quarter t, and 12 quarters after quarter t. To determine displaced workers, we 
used the same methodology as in figure 3.1. These are the estimates of  from empirical specification (1). Earnings were deflated by 







Figure 3.3: Conditional Earnings Losses Post-Estimation 
 
Notes: Empirical specification (1) is run for each quarter from the second quarter of 1999 to the second quarter of 2010. The net PDV 

















Figure 3.4: Non-employment Periods for Displaced Workers 
 
Notes: The denominator is the displaced worker sample for a given quarter. The blue time series represents the share of displaced 
workers with exactly 0 quarters of non-employment during the subsequent 12 quarters. The red time series represents the share of 
displaced workers who had between one and four quarters of non-employment, inclusive. The green time series represents the share of 
displaced workers who had between five and eight quarters of non-employment, inclusive. The purple time series represents the share 
of displaced workers who had between nine and twelve quarters of non-employment, inclusive. These are mutually exclusive and 

















































































Figure 3.5: Supersector Switchers Share 
 
Notes: The denominator is the displaced worker sample for a given quarter. “Cross-Supersector Job Switchers” are displaced workers 
who were re-employed within a different Supersector from their origin job during any quarter within the three years after a job loss. 
The “Within-Supersector Job Switchers” are all other displaced workers who were re-employed during any quarter within the three 
years after a job loss. The “Non-employed all 12 Quarters” cohort are displaced workers who were not employed for every quarter for 























































Figure 3.6: Supersector, Non-employment Combinations 
 
Notes: The denominator is the displaced worker sample for a given quarter. The definitions of “Cross-Supersector Job Switchers” and 
“Within-Supersector Job Switchers” are provided in figure 3.5. These definitions are partitioned based on the count of non-
employment quarters the displaced worker had after a job loss. The purple time series represents the displaced workers who were 





















































































































































































Figure 3.7: Household Unemployment Insurance Benefits 
 
Notes: The sample here is the set of households who have at least one displaced worker (as defined by LEHD data) within the CPS. If 
a worker is displaced during calendar year t, I use the t+1 year for the CPS. For example, if a displaced worker is displaced during the 
second quarter of 2002, the 2003 CPS is used for him. The unemployment insurance benefits presented are the yearly unemployment 
benefits received by all displaced workers within a household.    


















Figure 3.8: Household Earnings Losses 
 
Notes: The sample is the set of households that contain at least one displaced worker or job stayer (as defined within the LEHD) that 
took part in the CPS for that year. Earnings losses is defined as the difference in the average earnings of households who have at least 
one displaced worker relative to the same statistic for households with at least one job stayer (and no displaced worker). The Earnings 
Losses, Net Unemployment Benefits is defined as the sum between the average unemployment benefits and the earnings losses. 




















Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics 
  1999 Q2-2001 Q1 2001 Recession 2002 Q1-2007 Q3 Great Recession 2009 Q3-2010 Q2 
  Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers 
Age 
 35 to 40 31% 29% 29% 27% 28% 25% 27% 24% 26% 24% 
 41 to 45 26% 27% 26% 27% 26% 26% 24% 24% 24% 24% 
 46 to 50 24% 25% 24% 25% 25% 27% 26% 27% 27% 27% 
 51 to 55 19% 20% 21% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 24% 26% 
Race/Ethnicity 
White, Not Hispanic 77% 81% 77% 81% 74% 79% 70% 77% 70% 75% 
Black, Not Hispanic 8% 6% 9% 7% 10% 8% 10% 8% 9% 8% 
Asian, Not Hispanic 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
Other, Not Hispanic 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Hispanic 12% 9% 10% 8% 12% 9% 16% 11% 16% 12% 
Education 
< High School 13% 9% 13% 9% 13% 9% 16% 10% 15% 10% 
High School 29% 27% 31% 28% 30% 28% 33% 28% 31% 28% 
Some College 30% 31% 29% 31% 30% 31% 30% 31% 30% 31% 
College 29% 33% 27% 32% 27% 32% 22% 31% 24% 31% 
Count 178,330 1,356,654 110,877 651,075 598,702 5,575,129 289,818 1,879,251 123,228 1,101,161 
 
 







Table 3.2: Firm Characteristics 
  Pre-2001 Recession 2001 Recession 2002 Q1-2007 Q3 Great Recession 2009 Q3-2010 Q2 
  Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers Displaced Stayers 
Supersector 
Natural Resources and 
Mining 5% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 
Construction 10% 6% 11% 6% 15% 7% 20% 7% 24% 6% 
Manufacturing 28% 26% 34% 26% 26% 24% 30% 21% 23% 21% 
Trade, Transportation, 
and Utilities 20% 23% 19% 23% 19% 24% 17% 24% 16% 24% 
Information 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 
Financial Activities 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 
Professional and 
Business Services 14% 8% 15% 9% 14% 10% 13% 10% 13% 11% 
Education and Health 
Services 8% 13% 5% 13% 9% 12% 5% 13% 8% 13% 
Leisure and Hospitality 5% 3% 4% 3% 5% 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 
Other Services 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 
Government 2% 10% 1% 10% 1% 9% 1% 9% 1% 9% 
Firmsize 
x>=500 29% 50% 28% 48% 26% 47% 23% 46% 21% 45% 
50<=x<500 51% 30% 51% 31% 50% 32% 53% 32% 51% 32% 
50>x 20% 20% 21% 21% 23% 22% 24% 22% 29% 23% 
Count 178,330 1,356,654 110,877 651,075 598,702 5,575,129 289,818 1,879,251 123,228 1,101,161 
 
Notes: Supersector refers to the job stayer’s firm’s Supersector, or the Supersector of the firm where the displaced worker lost his job. 















Age 2% -2% 1% -4% 
Education 0% -3% -3% -8% 
Race-Ethnicity 2% 6% -2% 0% 
Non-employment 48% 34% 110% 108% 
Supersector Change 16% 22% 23% 43% 
Non-employment, Supersector Change 50% 42% 110% 111% 
Initial Supersector 6% 20% 14% -10% 
 
Notes: The shift share is calculated using equation (3). The baseline (t-1) period used here is [1999 Quarter 2, 2001 Quarter 1]. The outcome of interest is the Net 
PDV as defined by equation (2). The shares are the share of the difference in the Net PDV across time explained by the category. For age, the brackets used were 
[35, 39], [40, 44], [45, 49], and [50, 55]. For education, the categories used were less than high school completion, only high school completion, some college, 
and college completion. For race-ethnicity, the categories used were Hispanic, White and not Hispanic, Black and not Hispanic, Asian and not Hispanic, Other 
and not Hispanic. For initial Supersector, I used the BLS defined Supersectors as the separate categories (Natural resources and mining, Construction, 
Manufacturing, Trade Transportation and Utilities, Information, Financial Activities, Professional and Business Services, Education and Health Services, Leisure 
and Hospitality, Other Services, Government). For non-employment duration, the categories used were each quarter of potential values for non-employment 
within the subsequent 12 quarters (so thirteen values from 0 to 12, inclusive). For Supersector change, the categories used were Supersector change, no change in 
the Supersector, and twelve quarters of non-employment. For Supersector change interacted with non-employment duration, the categories used are each of the 
first 12 values of the possible non-employment duration values interacted with either changing Supersector or not (so 24 categories), as well as twelve quarters of 





Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
Appendix Figure 3.1: Conditional Log Earnings Evolution - Displaced Workers Relative to Job Stayers 
 
Note: The cohorts used within this figure are the same as the cohorts used within the level regressions. The dependent variable used 































Appendix Table 3.1: Baseline Regression Estimates, Earnings Losses 
Quarters Since 
Displacement 








[2009 Q3, 2010 
Q2] 
-11 -$139 -$262 -$243 -$146 -$372 
-10 $46 -$51 $6 $137 $5 
-9 $143 $7 $120 $156 $85 
-8 $11 -$18 $44 -$43 $35 
-7 -$290 -$404 -$360 -$380 -$531 
-6 -$75 -$142 -$101 -$108 -$213 
-5 -$17 -$69 -$27 -$102 -$165 
-4 -$144 -$185 -$141 -$341 -$373 
-3 -$523 -$699 -$610 -$815 -$1,047 
-2 -$358 -$588 -$423 -$659 -$938 
-1 -$514 -$733 -$536 -$937 -$1,031 
0 -$1,873 -$2,522 -$2,183 -$3,167 -$3,557 
1 -$6,539 -$7,707 -$7,680 -$8,391 -$9,089 
2 -$4,484 -$6,021 -$5,609 -$6,898 -$7,237 
3 -$4,019 -$5,372 -$4,897 -$6,299 -$6,322 
4 -$3,948 -$5,265 -$4,644 -$6,183 -$6,055 
5 -$4,071 -$5,420 -$4,718 -$6,187 -$6,233 
6 -$3,909 -$5,226 -$4,499 -$5,864 -$5,560 
7 -$3,904 -$5,014 -$4,400 -$5,654 -$5,310 
8 -$3,923 -$5,130 -$4,382 -$5,597 -$5,241 
9 -$4,171 -$5,226 -$4,573 -$5,614 -$5,395 
10 -$3,999 -$5,045 -$4,425 -$5,380 -$5,028 
11 -$4,022 -$4,787 -$4,359 -$5,224 -$4,864 
12 -$4,043 -$4,921 -$4,416 -$5,258 -$4,933 





Notes: These are the estimates displayed within figure 3.2. Positive values of “Quarters Since Displacement” represent the number of 
quarters after job loss, negative values represent the number of quarters before job loss, and 0 indexes the quarter of job loss. All point 
estimates after “Quarters Since Displacement” = 0 (inclusive) are significant at the 5% level when using OLS standard errors. The 
earnings losses statistic displayed is calculated from empirical equation (2). The cohorts used were the displaced workers and job 
stayers during the respective periods. For example, the [1999 Q2, 2001 Q1] cohort have the people who were displaced during any of 
the quarters from 1999 Quarter 2 to 2001 Quarter 1 (inclusive) and the people who were considered job stayers during any of the 
quarters from 1999 Quarter 2 to 2001 Quarter 1 (inclusive). To determine job stayers, we ensured that the worker had 24 consecutive 
quarters of employment at the same establishment; 12 quarters before quarter t and 12 quarters after quarter t. To determine displaced 
workers, we used the same methodology as in figure 3.1. These are the estimates of  from empirical specification (1). Earnings 











Chapter 4: Interstate Migration and Job-to-Job Flows 
 (Co-Authored with Henry Hyatt, Erika McEntarfer, and Alexandria Zhang) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
When households move to a new state, they commonly change employers. 
This economic migration generally results in better outcomes for workers, who often 
receive pay increases when changing jobs.57 Recent work by Hsieh and Moretti 
(2016) argues that migration plays a key role in placing workers in high productivity 
areas, leading to greater economic growth, and studies by Dahl (2002) and Wozniak 
(2010) show that labor markets that offer higher wages attract more migrants than 
those that offer lower wages. Because of the importance of population reallocation in 
the U.S., recent studies such as Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2014) and Kaplan and 
Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) have explored an apparent decline in the interstate migration 
rate in recent decades. Moreover, because people often switch jobs when they move 
to a different state, some studies including Hyatt and Spletzer (2013) and Molloy et 
al. (2016) have speculated that changing interstate migration may be part of a broader 
phenomenon of slowing of U.S. labor market dynamics, which exhibited a sharp 
decline starting in 2000.58   
In this chapter, we explore the relationship between job switching and 
interstate migration for the working-age population, taking advantage of recently 
available administrative records data. We show that the timing and extent of changes 
in interstate migration are different from those of job-to-job flows, the latter of which 
                                                 
57 See Topel and Ward (1992) and Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012). 





exhibits its most dramatic decline after the year 2000. We also document that there 
are considerable differences across data sources on the timing and magnitude of 
changes in interstate migration, while there is substantial agreement across data 
sources on the trends in job change. We explore matched survey and administrative 
data, and although we can explain some of the overall disagreement between data 
sources, we make little progress in explaining divergent trends. There is considerably 
more agreement on the recent trend in job-to-job flows between different data 
sources, and we also find that economic migration is associated with a similar share 
of overall interstate migration in survey and administrative records data sources. We 
also explore changing demographics and employer composition, as well as the 
earnings changes when workers move across states, in understanding recent changes 
to interstate migration. 
 We present evidence from a number of data sources on interstate migration 
and job-to-job flows for the U.S., including both household surveys and 
administrative records.  Our most distinctive contribution is we are able to explore the 
evolution of interstate migration using administrative records from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program, a topic that 
has been explored in some detail in previous work using the same data (Goetz 2013). 
The LEHD data permit calculation of the interstate migration at an annual frequency 
from the year 2000 onwards, and we have a longitudinally consistent series for 2000-
2010. The LEHD data also contain rich data on job-to-job flows, see Hyatt et al. 
(2014), so it is possible to identify the subset of people who change their state of 




data sources that have been considered in previous studies of interstate migration 
rates and job-to-job flows. We use the Current Population Survey (CPS), the most 
commonly used dataset for the study of job-to-job flows, as well as interstate 
migration. The LEHD data have also been linked to the CPS, which permit a 
comparison of survey with administrative records data.  In addition to the LEHD and 
CPS, we also consider interstate migration from published aggregates of interstate 
migration from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income, which, like 
the LEHD data, are of administrative records, as well as survey data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS). 
 We begin our empirical analysis by documenting the trend in interstate 
migration for the working age population. We present a simple comparison of the 
trends of these different sources.  Although previous studies such as Molloy, Smith, 
and Wozniak (2011) and Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) have included 
comparisons of different data series on interstate migration, there have been no 
satisfactory explanations for the substantial divergence in levels and trends between 
these different data sources. From the 1980s to 2000, the IRS and CPS both show 
declines that are concentrated in the 1990s, however, the CPS and IRS are noticeably 
different in the years following 2000, with the CPS showing a strong decline but the 
IRS not. This post-2000 decline appears after dropping imputed and allocated values 
following Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012), and if we had not dropped such 
observations, the post-2000 decline would have been much stronger. To better 
understand what happened to interstate migration rates from the year 2000 onward, 




LEHD, and these two data sources are quite similar to the IRS, and show modest 
procyclicality without a strong decline.  
 To better understand the idiosyncratic post-2000 decline in the CPS, we 
conduct an analysis using CPS microdata linked with LEHD administrative records, 
and explore the frequency with which migration is report in the CPS, LEHD, or both. 
This is important because the CPS is the data source of reference on papers that 
consider the decline in interstate migration such as Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 
(2011, 2014) and Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2015). The matched CPS-LEHD 
dataset shows a similar migration rate to both the overall CPS and LEHD migration 
rates, suggesting that the difference in interstate migration rates is a measurement 
issue rather than an indication of which households are present in administrative 
records data relative to survey data.  We also make some progress in understanding, 
at the person level, how survey responses and administrative records disagree. Some 
of the differences are due to different timing in the CPS relative to the LEHD 
(residential migration generally appears later in administrative data than in survey 
responses), as well as the greater tendency of the LEHD data to have moves to a state 
and back to the original state after exactly one year. However, these explanations do 
not have an evident time trend and so we can only rule out these as potential 
explanations for why the post-2000 decline in the interstate migration rate is so much 
larger in the CPS than in other data series.  
 Our data also allow us to account for the relationship between interstate 
migration and job change. The CPS and LEHD allow us to measure the frequency 




economic migration from other forms of migration. Our descriptive analysis yields a 
few conclusions. First, we see substantial agreement between the CPS and LEHD in 
the extent and cyclicality of job-to-job transitions. Second, we note that workers 
change jobs several times more frequently than people change their state of residence. 
Third, the LEHD data provide results consistent with the existent evidence from the 
CPS that on the order of one-third of all interstate migration is associated with job 
change.  Fourth, changes in economic migration account for somewhat more of the 
(albeit smaller) decline in the LEHD interstate migration compared to that of the CPS. 
 Our LEHD data allow us to examine in detail the changes in interstate 
migration and economic migration from 2000 to 2010.  We use the LEHD data to 
conduct two exercises.  First, we compute shift-share decompositions that allow us to 
understand the role of the aging of the U.S. population, changing industry mix, and 
other composition aspects of employers and the workforce. Whenever the data 
permit, we also compute corresponding estimates from the CPS. Overall, our findings 
are similar to Molloy et al. (2016) who find that the ageing of the population can 
explain some of the change in interstate migration, but that changes in the industry 
composition in the U.S. have an offsetting effect.   
 Second, we measure the earnings of workers before and after changing their 
state of work and state of residence. We document that the earnings changes that are 
associated with interstate migration are lower than those associated with job change 
overall, but much higher than those changes experienced by those who do not switch 
jobs. We also show that these earnings changes are procyclical, dropping during and 




permit a time series that the CPS cannot: because the CPS does not track movers, it is 
only possible to use that data source to measure earnings after migration, and not 
before, so it is not possible to measure the earnings changes associated with interstate 
migration using the CPS alone. 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we describe the data 
sources used in this chapter.  We then present evidence on trends in residential 
migration, comparing the LEHD administrative data to the more widely available 
survey data and conducting an analysis on linked survey and administrative records 
data. We then consider shifts in job mobility and the role of economic migration and 
its relationship to changes in interstate migration.  Next, we conduct shift-share 
decompositions of the declines in the residential and economic migration rates to 
quantify the role of observable and unobservable factors in explaining these declines.  
Thereafter, we explore the role of earnings changes associated with staying in a job or 




 We utilize several data sources on interstate migration and job-to-job flows. 
We start with a description of the most commonly used data source, the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), then discuss the American Community Survey (ACS). In 
our analysis of both the CPS and ACS, we restrict our sample to the civilian 
population aged 16 to 64 (in the ACS analysis we also exclude the group quarters 




data for the years 2000 to 2010, so in the sections that follow, we pay more attention 
to that interval. However, we also put those years in the broader context of the 1980s 
to 2014 as data permit.  
 
4.2.1 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Because of its long time series and public-use microdata, the CPS is the most 
commonly used dataset for the study of interstate migration, as well as for job-to-job 
flows.  Interstate migration in the March CPS (Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC) asks respondents where they lived one year ago.59  It is possible 
to use this data source to create a time series that spans several decades, however, in 
order to draw conclusions about the post-2000 trend in interstate migration, it is 
important to note that CPS data processing has changed over time.  As recommended 
by Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012), we exclude respondents with imputed 
migration responses, which change discontinuously in the early 2000s for reasons that 
have little or nothing to do with actual interstate migration.60  The CPS collects 
information on an individual’s reason for migrating, one of which is starting or 
transferring to a new job, which has been analyzed by both Molloy et al. (2011) and 
Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) and so serves as the main measure of economic 
migration from the CPS.   
                                                 
59 We use the CPS March supplement (ASEC) data from the University of Minnesota’s Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series, see Ruggles et al. (2015).   
60 In excluding imputed responses, it is also necessary to drop individuals with migration responses 
assigned from the householder (i.e., primary respondent) if the householder’s response is imputed. 




Job-to-job transitions can be measured from the CPS ASEC, as well as the 
monthly CPS.  The ASEC began asking a retrospective question on the number of 
jobs a respondent held in the last year starting in 1976.  If the respondent reports 
working for more than one employer in the last year, this suggests that the worker 
experienced a job-to-job transition, and the time trend of this proxy for job-to-job 
transitions has been analyzed by Farber (1999), Stewart (2007), Hyatt (2015), and 
Molloy et al. (2016). In addition to this proxy measure, it is possible to measure the 
job-to-job flow rate directly from the monthly CPS data, following Fallick and 
Fleischman (2004).61  We use both the annual and monthly job-to-job transition rates 
from the CPS as a comparison to the job-to-job flow series we construct from the 
LEHD data, which is the only other data source in our analysis that has job-to-job 
flow information.  
It is important to note that the CPS does not track movers, and so does not 
permit comparisons of earnings before and after a job-to-job transition. Unlike the 
LEHD, it does not permit the measurement of the returns to economic migration. 
Therefore, while we are able to compare job-to-job flow rates across the two 
databases, we are unable to compare returns to economic migration across the two 
databases. 
 
                                                 
61 We obtain the CPS monthly data from NBER at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html (last 




4.2.2. American Community Survey (ACS) 
 The American Community Survey is a large nationally representative cross-
sectional survey of the United States.62 To identify migrants, the ACS asks a 
retrospective question that is similar to the one asked in the CPS.  There are some 
notable differences between the two surveys, however.  First, the ACS pursues 
nonrespondents more intensively than the CPS (Koerber 2007).  As people who move 
more frequently may be less likely to respond to surveys, migration rates in the ACS 
may be higher than the CPS.  Second, the ACS asks respondents about their current 
address, not their usual address (the concept used in the CPS).  This largely impacts 
college students who, in the ACS, are primarily in the group quarters sample (which 
we exclude).  In the CPS, households that include college students residing elsewhere 
are instructed to include them in the household. The ACS spans 2001 to present, and 
provides migration information as well as demographic characteristics, although it 
neither asks people their reason for moving, nor does not collect information on job-
to-job transitions, and so we are unable to measure the rate of economic migration 
using the ACS.63  We also obtain ACS data for the year 2000 from the Census 2000 
Supplemental Survey, the precursor to the ACS.64  
 
                                                 
62 We download ACS data for the year 2001 onward from the iPUMS website at 
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/ (last accessed: May 18, 2016), see Ruggles et al. (2015). 
63 Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) exclude pre-2005 ACS data from their study due to concerns 
about changes in survey methodology that occurred between 2001 and 2005, the year in which it 
reached its final size as a 1-in-60 sample of the U.S. population.  However, we include estimates for 
pre-2005 years here as the ACS migration rate does not appear to us to change for reasons that can be 
demonstrably related to changes in survey methodology. 





4.2.3 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
In line with recent studies, we also use data provided by the IRS’s Statistics of 
Income program to calculate gross interstate migration rates.65 As mentioned above, 
we are able to produce a longer time series with these data that is comparable to the 
length of the CPS series. Moreover, the IRS migration rates are calculated from year-
to-year changes in state of residence on individual tax returns so they should track the 
LEHD data quite closely, and indeed they do as we will see in the next section. 
Specifically, the number of personal exemptions on each tax return is used to 
approximate the number of individuals (versus households).  
 
4.2.4 Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
We use linked employer-employee data from the LEHD program at the U.S. 
Census Bureau to examine the connection between trends in declining job mobility 
and declining residential migration.  The LEHD data consist of quarterly worker-level 
earnings submitted by employers for the administration of state unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefit programs, linked to establishment-level data collected for the 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages program.  This core linked employer-
employee data is merged with Census survey and administrative data for additional 
information on workers and employers. As of this writing, all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia have shared these data as part of the Local Employment 
                                                 
65 Recent years (1990-2014) of IRS data are available from the IRS website at 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-migration-data (last accessed: May 18, 2016). Data for earlier 
years were downloaded from the website of the National Archives, and although there is not a main 
page with liks to these files, they can be downloaded by following the URL that stores a query for 
these data, see 
https://catalog.archives.gov/search?q=*:*&rows=20&tabType=all&facet=true&facet.fields=oldScope,l
evel,materialsType,fileFormat,locationIds,dateRangeFacet&highlight=true&f.parentNaId=646447&f.l




Dynamics federal-state partnership.  LEHD data coverage is quite broad; state UI 
covers about 95% of private sector employment, as well as state and local 
government.66 The LEHD data has also been linked to the CPS, allowing for a 
person-level comparison of interstate migration as captured by administrative records 
with responded migration obtained from survey data. 
Part of the LEHD data infrastructure is an annual residential file called the 
Composite Person Record (CPR).  We use this file to identify migrants in the LEHD 
data.  The CPR is constructed from multiple administrative data sources, including 
some federal program data and federal tax filings, see Leggieri, Pistiner, and Farber 
(2002).  Using tax data to study migration has some disadvantages, such as the ability 
of filers to file early or late also means any change in residential location between tax 
years could have taken place anytime between two filing windows.  Given this 
limitation, we use the following assignment rule to time migrations in LEHD.  
Because most households file their returns between January and early April, and the 
seasonal pattern of migration is such that winter months have the lowest migration 
rates, if the residential address associated with an individual’s tax return changes 
from the previous year its subsequent year, we label the migration as a subsequent 
year move.  Unfortunately, a longitudinally consistent CPR is only available until 
2010, and so our primary analysis of the LEHD trend in interstate migration must end 
then.67  The CPR is constructed from data that is similar to the input data for the IRS 
                                                 
66 For an overview of the LEHD data, see Abowd et al. (2009). 
67 A somewhat differently constructed 2011 CPR allowed the calculation of a migration rate comparing 
2010 and 2011.  We have less confidence in this data point, and so although we include it in our first 
figure for completeness, we do not attempt to explain it in subsequent results or analyses.  A 
replacement residential file for LEHD has been constructed from tax records for later years, which is 
called the LEHD Residence Candidacy File (RCF) and is available for years 2012 and 2013.  




Statistics of Income public-use migration series, which accounts for the similarity 
between these series in the results that follow. 
The LEHD data allow us to identify job movers who also had a residence 
change at the time of the job change.  One objective of this paper is to evaluate role of 
job-to-job flows in explaining changes in the interstate migration rate.  To identify 
these job-to-job flows in the LEHD data, we link the main jobs in each quarter of a 
worker’s employment history.68  When a worker separates from a job and begins 
work at a new job within a short time period (starting work at the new employer in 
either the same quarter or the next), we classify this move as a job-to-job flow.69  
Transitions with longer periods of nonemployment (at least one full-quarter of zero 
earnings) are not considered job-to-job flows, but flows to and from employment.   
In this paper, we define a cross-state migration in the LEHD data as an 
economic migration as follows: if we observe a person to have both an interstate 
residential move and a cross-state job to job flow during the same pair of years, we 
assume that the job change motivated the move. This approach has a few limitations. 
A worker who has been long unemployed in one location who moves to a better labor 
market to find work would not be classified as making an “economic” move under 
our definition (this is, however, one of the least cited reasons for making a residential 
                                                                                                                                           
this is 2.5%.  Comparing the 2012 RCF to the 2013 RCF yields a migration rate of 2.6%, which is 
similar to the IRS migration rate that compares those two years. 
68 Linking all main jobs (defined as the employer at which a given worker had maximal earnings in a 
given quarter) in a worker’s employment history is also used to identify job-to-job flows in Hyatt and 
McEntarfer (2012) and Haltiwanger et al. (2015). The new Census Job-to-Job Flows statistics use a 
slightly different methodology, linking main jobs held on the first day of each quarter (and so taking 
the job with maximum earnings from summing earnings in the two respective quarters), see Hyatt et al.  
(2014). 
69 Specifically, between employers measured at the level of the state Unemployment Insurance 
account.  These accounts can and often do contain multiple establishments, so within-state transfers 
between establishments are not counted as job-to-job flows.  In contrast, transfers within a firm but 




move in the CPS).  Similarly, a trailing spouse who does not work (either voluntarily 
or involuntarily) in either the origin or destination market would also not be classified 
as making an economic move, even if the move was motivated by a new job for the 
household head.  Consequently, we will undercount moves driven by relative job 
opportunities.  We will also misclassify some moves as being economic that are 
driven by family reasons or relative amenities, if the migrant moves very quickly 
between jobs. 
LEHD residence data is available for the entire U.S. back to the year 1999.  
Therefore,  we calculate national interstate migration rates for the year 2000 (which is 
a comparison of the year 2000 state of residence with the 1999 state of residence) 
onward.  However, because employment data from different states become available 
in different years, when considering economic migration in the LEHD, we make a 
state restriction on both the origin and destination of the residential move and the job 
flow (see Henderson and Hyatt 2012).  Specifically, we only look at the set of states 
with complete data beginning in 1999.70  Although this additional restriction induces 
a level shift downward in our overall and economic migration rate, the changes in the 
interstate migration rate match those of the national series. 
Despite the constraints of the LEHD data, it offers a number of advantages 
over survey data. As noted previously, the coverage of the data is expansive and thus 
gives us a much larger sample size than the CPS or ACS. Additionally, survey data 
often contain measurement error that arises from self-reporting, but the LEHD data is 
                                                 
70 These 34 states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  




free from this particular type of error. A third advantage of the LEHD data is that it 
allows us to identify earnings changes associated with a job transition and thus test 
the hypothesis that the decline in migration has been driven by declining returns to 
migration. 
 
4.3 Interstate Migration in the U.S. 1981-2014 
4.3.1 Comparison of Interstate Migration Rates in LEHD, CPS, ACS, and IRS Data 
We begin by comparing the rates of residential migration in these different 
data series. This is a useful starting point, but some caution is warranted when 
comparing these data because these series do change at different times and for 
different reasons. Recent changes to these data series are reasonably well 
documented.  For example, thanks to Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012) it is known 
that substantial changes occur to the edit and imputation procedures applied to the 
CPS which make the decline look even larger than the series we present.  Also the 
IRS changed its methodology between 2011 and 2012 and the interstate migration 
rate jumps between these years.71 However, changes may be present in earlier years, 
and when we see sudden changes in data series, it is unknown to us whether these are 
due to data phenomena or to genuine changes in interstate migration. 
Figure 4.1 presents the interstate residential migration rates calculated from 
the CPS, ACS, IRS, and LEHD data sources.72  The CPS and IRS data have the 
longest time-series, and both show a decline in interstate migration from 
                                                 
71 See Internal Revenue Service (2012). 
72 We also provide CPS rates for the restricted set of states, comparable to the set used in the LEHD in 




approximately 3% in 1985 to 2.5% in 2000.  Starting in 2000, however, trends in the 
CPS and IRS series diverge substantially.  Interstate migration in the CPS continues 
its decline to 1.4% by 2010, with the exception of a slight recovery in 2005 and 2006 
that we see reflected in the IRS data, corresponding to the economic recovery. 
However, the IRS migration rate is more procyclical, increasing the in early 2000s 
and reaching 2.7% in 2006 – compared to 1.9% in the CPS that only drops to 2.2% by 
2010.  The ACS shows a nearly identical cyclical pattern to the IRS. As stated earlier, 
the LEHD interstate migration rate also closely mirrors the IRS migration rate for all 
available years.  
Table 4.1 presents the correlations between the series in Figure 4.1.  The post-
2000 correlation between the IRS and CPS migration rate is reasonably strong at 
0.665, as well as the post-2000 correlation between the CPS and the LEHD at 0.688, 
but these correlations are far lower than the correlation of the overall (i.e. 1981-2014) 
time series of 0.841 between the CPS and IRS. The ACS is also more strongly 
correlated with the CPS (0.835), which is another recent correlation since we do not 
have ACS data prior to 2000.  These correlations indicate that despite the stronger 
downward trend in the CPS relative to the other data sources, they tend to move 
together.  The LEHD and IRS series are very strongly correlated at 0.917. 
Any post-2000 decline in interstate migration is largest as measured by the 
CPS. The ACS, IRS, and LEHD data exhibit procyclicality with perhaps a lower level 
in the years following the 2007-2009 recession.  However, given that the CPS is the 




discrepancy in more detail. We undertake this endeavor by linking the LEHD and 
CPS, the findings from which we detail below. 
 
4.3.2 Evidence from Matched CPS and LEHD Data  
We consider linked CPS-LEHD data for the years 2002-2009, where the 
divergence between the CPS and the other data series is concentrated. We select 
individuals who appear in the CPS as well as have LEHD residential addresses in the 
preceding and subsequent two years in order to evaluate mis-timed migration flows, 
as well as the phenomenon of migration that is immediately reversed in the next year. 
The Protected Identification Key (PIK) is a variable available in both the CPS and the 
LEHD that uniquely identifies each individual and allows us to construct a common 
sample. Figure 4.2 shows that the CPS-LEHD has surprisingly comparable migration 
as measured in each of these respective data sources.  The population is the same by 
construction (the set of individuals who respond to the CPS and match to 
administrative records). This suggests that much of the difference between the CPS 
and LEHD interstate migration rates is due to something other than the set of 
individuals who appear in either the CPS or administrative records. 
Figure 4.3 presents migration rates using this linked CPS-LEHD sample with 
the same sample selection criteria used in the previous figure.  The dotted line shows 
the migration rate calculated using the individuals in the linked sample whose 
outcomes agree between the CPS and LEHD. The rate for this group is somewhat 
cyclical but otherwise exhibits a persistent downward trend much like the original 




support to the story that interstate residential migration has unambiguously declined 
over this period.   
The dashed line in the figure shows the rate at which individuals who reported 
moving across states only in the CPS, and the solid line shows the analogous LEHD 
rates.  The puzzle that emerges here is the significant jump in migration for the 
LEHD-only set of individuals from 2004 to 2005, leading to a higher level of 
migration that persists over a majority of the remaining years.  The sudden jump in 
the LEHD Only line is puzzling, and suggests that part of the increase in the LEHD 
data (and, because of similar data sources, perhaps also the IRS data) may be due to a 
data phenomenon rather than a true increase in migration. Alternatively, the CPS 
migration rate may have fallen at the same time as interstate migration exhibited a 
strong increase. Caution is warranted here because we do not have a good 
understanding of what caused this jump.  We can, however, rule out a few 
explanations with the following exercises.  
To further explore the disagreement between the CPS and LEHD, we measure 
the extent to which we can attribute it to timing issues, arising either from 
imprecision in survey responses or from late tax filers affecting he timing of LEHD 
migration, shown in Table 4.2. The first two columns of Table 4.2 show the 
percentage of the matched data for which the observed CPS move (between a given 
pair of origin and destination states) appears in the LEHD in either preceding or 
subsequent year.  That the LEHD migration appears after the CPS rather than before 
suggests that late tax filers affect the disagreement between the CPS and LEHD.  The 




the CPS where the origin state is the same in both the CPS and LEHD, suggesting 
that CPS responses tend to include short-term or temporary moves.  Unfortunately, 
there is no question in the CPS that sheds light on residential moves that last less than 
one year.  These timing issues account for a substantial two-thirds of these CPS-only 
migration outcomes, while the residual one-third remains unexplained. 
 We also investigate a pattern that is more prevalent in the LEHD than the CPS 
due to the nature of administrative data.  Table 4.3 explores the prevalence of 
interstate migration that is immediately reversed. Transition statistics that employ a 
strategy for choosing a single outcome (one of 50 states of residence, one of several 
million employers, etc.) commonly have more such immediate reversals than 
economic activity might indicate, see Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012) on job-to-job 
flows.  Immediately reversed migration is the observed event where the individual 
moves from state X to state Y in year t, and then moves back to state X in year t+1.  
Table 4.2 shows the frequency with which this phenomenon is associated with 
interstate migration that appears in the CPS co-incident with the LEHD, as well as 
those that appear in the LEHD only.  Migrations that appear in the LEHD but not the 
CPS are twice as likely to be part of an immediately reversed migration than those 
that appear in both data sources.  Nevertheless, immediately reversed migrations only 
occur in 12% to 19% of migration that only appears in the LEHD. 
That the LEHD contains more such moves could be related to the way the 
administrative data deal with individuals reporting multiple residences, i.e. error in 
predicting primary residence, and, thus, to the likelihood that the observed LEHD 




from both Table 4.1 and 4.2 is that none of these issues we have detailed has trended 
in such a way that could explain the jump in the migration rate seen in the LEHD-
only line in Figure 4.2, discussed above.  However, we made some progress toward 
explaining the disagreement and the difference in levels between the CPS and LEHD 
migration rates. 
 
4.4 Interstate Migration and Job-to-Job Flows 
4.4.1 Trends in the Job-to-Job Flows 
We now examine the role of job-to-job flows in interstate migration. Given 
the large divergence in interstate migration trends between the CPS and LEHD data 
during this decade, we check to see if they show similar declines in labor market 
fluidity, measured by declines in job-to-job moves.  While the annual metric of job-
to-job flows in the CPS can be compared to interstate migration directly in the 
microdata, the job-to-job flows in the CPS only are present when a household does 
not move. Figure 4.4 shows quarterly job-to-job flow rates calculated from the CPS 
and LEHD, as well as an annual proxy from the CPS: the fraction of those employed 
who worked for multiple employers in the last year.73 Perhaps surprisingly given the 
divergence in migration rates in these two series, here all three measures track each 
other very closely between 2000 and 2010, though differences widen after 2010 with 
the LEHD data showing more of a recovery than the CPS.74  In all three series, the 
job-to-job flow rate is procyclical, and the implied quarterly job-to-job flow rate 
                                                 
73 We also show CPS rates for the set of restricted states in Figure 4.A3. 
74 The later years in the CPS monthly series also show greater prevalence of missing job-to-job flow 




derived from the monthly CPS job-to-job flows series is very similar in levels to the 
LEHD series.  The LEHD job-to-job flow rate reached a high of 7.5% in 2000, 
declined to 5.8% in 2003, had recovered to 6.6% by 2005, reached a low of 4.4% 
during the 2007-2009 recession, and rebounded to 5.8% by the end of 2013.  This 
evidence on job-to-job flows is consistent with the findings of Hyatt and McEntarfer 
(2012) and Hyatt (2015). 
The much longer annual job-to-job transition series from the CPS suggests 
that while job-to-job flows were also cyclical between 1980 and 1998, they did not 
exhibit a downward trend.75  Therefore, declines in job-to-job moves overall do not 
appear to drive the observed decline in residential migration in the CPS and IRS data 
from the 1980s to 2000.76 Moreover, this similarity between the CPS and the LEHD 
data suggests the discrepancy in residential migration rates is not caused by a 
systemic error in the CPS, such as a weighting issue that would affect other outcomes, 
which motivates a separate investigation into where and why the CPS and LEHD data 
differ in identifying residential moves.  
The correlations between the different job-to-job flow and interstate migration 
series are of interest, and are included in Table 4.1.  We see that the frequency with 
                                                 
75 Although job-to-job flow rates show no obvious trend during the 1980s and 1990s, Decker et al. 
(2014) and Molloy et al. (2016) suggest that labor market fluidity may have declined from the 1970s to 
the 1990s. Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) provide evidence 
that mobility across industries and occupations increased over the span of those decades, while Hyatt 
(2015) and Hyatt and Spletzer (2016) provide evidence that labor market fluidity had little trend over 
these decades.  These seeming contradictions are due to differences in data sources and measurement, 
Decker et al. (2014) and Molloy et al. (2016) emphasize job reallocation rates across firms.  The other 
studies emphasize occupation and industry transitions, as well as data on job-to-job transitions and job 
tenure from household survey data. In any case, all data sources agree that the 15 years following the 
year 2000 have shown more of a decline than any decline apparent in previous decades. 
76 The March CPS ASEC asks about both migration and the number of employers worked in the last 
year, so one might alternatively measure economic migration as the rate with which individuals both 
changed states and worked at multiple employers in the last year.  Although the rates are similar for 




which workers report multiple employers in the past year is very strongly correlated 
with the interstate migration rate, with a correlation of 0.867 for the longer 1981-2014 
series and even higher at 0.916 for the more recent years. This higher correlation 
likely reflects that the CPS responses of multiple employers and different states of 
residence in the past year are trending downward post-2000. 
 
4.4.2 Economic Migration 
To examine the impact of declines in job mobility on interstate migration, we 
first quantify the extent to which residential migration has been driven by economic 
migration, i.e. the proportion of individuals moving across state lines at the same time 
as they also changed their state of employment. This is shown in Figure 4.5, where 
we compare economic moves in the LEHD and CPS data.  In both data sources, 
economic migration accounts for about a third of total residential migration in 2000. 
The cyclicality of the economic migration rate, like in the residential migration rate, 
is again more pronounced in the LEHD data than in the CPS. However, interstate 
economic migration rates in the CPS and LEHD data are much more similar than 
overall residential migration, with respect to both levels and trends.77 
Table 4.4 provides an overview of the trends shown in Figure 4.5 of interstate 
migration, job-to-job, and economic migration rates, when available, in the LEHD, 
CPS, and ACS from the period 2000 to 2010.  Given the stronger decline in interstate 
migration in the CPS, we are surprised to find that levels and trends for interstate 
moves for job-related reasons are more similar in the CPS and LEHD data.  In the 
                                                 




CPS, overall interstate migration rates fell by 50.6% between 2000 and 2010, 
compared to 20.1% in the LEHD data.78  There are also large differences in the 
decline in migrations for job-related reasons, which are 66.8% and 45.5% in the CPS 
and LEHD, respectively.  Additionally, economic migration rates in both series are so 
small that these percentage differences in the decline exaggerate the differences 
between the two series.  Economic interstate migration in the CPS fell from 0.9% in 
2000 to 0.5% in 2010, and in the LEHD data, the rate fell from 0.8% in 2000 to 0.5% 
in 2010.   
The CPS and LEHD data show somewhat different patterns in the role of 
economic migration in changing migration rates.  These differences in the overall 
decline in interstate migration do mean that we find a stronger role for declining job 
mobility in explaining declining interstate migration in the LEHD data.  62% of the 
decline in the interstate migration rate between 2000 and 2010 in the LEHD data is 
accounted for by the decline in job-to-job moves, compared to 49% of the decline in 
interstate migration rates for the corresponding period in the CPS data.  Both numbers 
highlight the importance of investigating how returns to economic migration in 
particular have changed over time. 
Table 4.4 also lists the other components of the decline in interstate migration 
in the CPS data, showing the CPS responses to the question about the reason for 
migration.  The decline in family-related moves accounts for the largest share of the 
decline in non-economic migration between 2000 and 2010.  The ‘new job/job 
transfer’ reason is by far the largest component of economic migration in the CPS, as 
                                                 
78 These percentages are proportionate changes, defined as the difference between the rate in 2010 and 




well as one-third of all interstate migrations in 2000, with ‘lost job/job search’ having 
the lowest frequency of all reasons for migration, or less than 5% of migrations in 
2000.  Additionally, ‘new job/job transfer’ experienced the largest percentage decline 
over the period, with ‘other job-related’ a close second but at a much lower level of 
occurrence, while ‘lost job/job search’ actually increased slightly. This stands as 
further evidence that job-to-job flows are the primary mechanism driving interstate 
migrations that have an economic motive. 
 
 
4.5 The Decline in Interstate Migration and Economic Migration: 2000-2010 
4.5.1 The Role of Composition in Declining Interstate Migration 
Because we have rich microdata on migration from the CPS and LEHD, we 
can explore new mechanisms that may have affected interstate migration and its 
economic component. The LEHD data especially provides information such as 
whether the decline in startups explains changes in interstate migration or its 
economic component. We perform a shift-share analysis following Hyatt and Spletzer 
(2013), Decker et al. (2014). Formally, this decomposition can be expressed as: 
∆ ∑ ∆ ∑ ∆ ̅ , 
where ∆  is the change in the migration rate from 2000 to 2010,  represents each 
group within a demographic category (e.g. age),  is the average transition rate for 
each ,  ̅  is the average share of each , ∆  is the change in the transition rate for 




component of the right-hand side captures the fraction of the change attributable to 
compositional changes, or explained variation, while the second component captures 
the fraction attributable to within-group changes, or unexplained variation. 
With both the CPS and LEHD data, we decompose residential and economic 
migration by age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and industry. Table 4.5 presents 
the results for the residential and economic migration rates using the CPS and LEHD. 
Compositional changes in age contribute the most among demographic characteristics 
to the change in residential migration in both data sets: 7% in the CPS and 16% in the 
LEHD. The U.S. workforce has been aging and older workers are less likely to move 
than younger workers. We also find that earnings have a large degree of explanatory 
power, which can also be attributed to young workers who are initially at low 
earnings levels.  
Similar results hold for the economic migration rate. Again, compositional 
changes in the age account for a large proportion of the decline from 2000 to 2010 
(9.0% for the CPS, 12.0% for the LEHD), while other demographic characteristics 
have little explanatory power, which is consistent with our residential migration 
findings. Given that there was relatively little change in labor market composition by 
race, ethnicity, and gender over this time period, it is not surprising to see that there 
were very little change in either the residential or the economic migration rate that 
arise from composition changes across any of the demographic categories other than 
age.  
We see large differences in the explanatory power of economic characteristics 




economic categories matter little for residential migration, different patterns arise 
when analyzing the economic migration rate.  For economic migration, in the CPS, 
the employment composition effect is roughly 2%, while it is 25% in the LEHD, 
while for economic migration, the effect of employment is offsetting in both the CPS 
and LEHD. This large difference likely arises from the way we define an economic 
migration in the LEHD: we use employment change during a residential move to 
define economic migration, which is more likely to include someone who was 
previously employed. We observe large effects from earnings and firm characteristics 
within the LEHD only when we include the non-employed as a category, and these 
effects disappear almost entirely when we subset to workers with positive earnings.79 
Industry compositional changes have negligible explanatory power in the CPS as 
well. The extra step we take with the LEHD data is to explore firm age and size, 
which Hyatt and Spletzer (2013), Decker et al. (2014) find play a small but noticeable 
role in explaining the trend in the job reallocation rate. The small effects of firm age 
and size, taken together with the finding of Hyatt and Spletzer (2013) and Decker et 
al. (2014), suggest that declining entrepreneurship, which has been documented as 
having a modest role in explaining other job and worker reallocation rates, does not 
explain much of the change in economic migration. Overall, these decompositions 
provide further evidence that most of the decline in the two migration rates should be 
attributed to changes in migration behavior within demographic and employment 
groups. 
 
                                                 





4.5.2 Changes in the Return to Interstate Migration 
In corroborating the findings of recent studies that shifts in observables 
contribute a small part to the declines in migration, we go on to investigate earnings 
changes associated with economic migrations, which is a feasible endeavor as the 
LEHD has a record of each worker’s longitudinal earnings history. We calculate the 
log earnings changes associated with an interstate job move as compared to earnings 
changes associated with other job changes, and then look at potential explanations for 
these earnings changes.  This is done on a quarterly basis as we have earnings 
observations at the quarterly level, and so for the subset of workers who have a state-
to-state job-to-job flow for a pair of years that indicate residential migration, we can 
date the migration to the quarter. 
Figure 4.6 shows the trend in annual log earnings changes associated with two 
types of labor market transitions: an interstate job-to-job flow with a change in state 
of residence, and a within-state job-to-job flow that may or may not be linked to a 
change in state of residence.80  As a baseline, those who are continuously employed 
for two years at the same employer and exhibit no job-to-job flows, i.e. job stayers, 
are also shown. The difference in log earnings is a measure of the percentage change 
in earnings, and so is straightforward to interpret. Job stayers have far lower earnings 
increases, which dip down to below zero during the height of the Great Recession. In 
contrast, and consistent with the evidence in Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012), workers 
                                                 
80 It is possible that these changes in earnings are driven by selection.  Therefore, we conducted two 
propensity score analyses that hold constant the probability of migrating. If the earnings changes 
associated with migrating are higher for those whose observable characteristics indicate that they are 
more likely to migrate, then the predicted returns to migration may be constant.  In Appendix B, we 





who exhibit either type of job-to-job flow see substantial increases in earnings, and 
these earnings increases are highly procyclical. During the late 1990s, in the year 
2005, and in the year 2010, earnings increase by about 15% for workers who change 
jobs but do not change the state of work or residence.  This falls to 9% during the 
2001 recession and 4% during the 2007-2009 recession.   
Individuals who change both states of work and residence have lower earnings 
changes, which are also procyclical and in the range of 3% to 14%. It initially seems 
counterintuitive that interstate migrants have lower earnings increases than non-
migrants since there is a positive cost to moving. However, when we look at levels of 
earnings over this time period, we find that migrants have substantially higher 
earnings than non-migrants – about 30-40% higher – while at the same time 
experience approximately the same earnings change in absolute terms as non-
migrants. These findings support the conventional wisdom that it tends to be the more 
highly-skilled who undergo long-distance moves. With that said, there is no notable 
trend in Figure 4.4 that would indicate returns to economic migration have declined 
over the period. 
  
4.6 Conclusion 
We have shown that the declines in interstate migration and job change occur 
at different times and are of different magnitudes. The decline in job change is 
concentrated after the year 2000, and interstate migration differs based on the data 
series under consideration. The CPS shows an increase in the interstate migration rate 




substantially less of a decline over a similar period, and the more recently available 
ACS and LEHD show a small post-2000 decline that is consistent with the IRS series.  
The timing and extent of the decline in the residential migration rate still seems to be 
an open question. 
Nevertheless, a considerable amount of interstate migration involves job 
change. In the CPS, survey respondents indicate that their interstate migration was 
due to fining a new job or changing jobs in about one-third of such transitions, which 
is confirmed by LEHD data. Between the years 2000 and 2010, interstate migration is 
procyclical with a declining trend in both the CPS and LEHD, although the declining 
trend is more apparent in the CPS than LEHD.  Furthermore, earnings increase 
substantially when workers change jobs and move across states, and that these 
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Figure 4.1: Interstate Residential Migration Rates 
 
Notes: Shaded areas denote recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Authors’ tabulations of Current Population Survey (CPS), American Community Survey (ACS), and 
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) microdata, as well as published tabulations 
of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data.  CPS, ACS, and LEHD migration rates are calculated for the 
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Figure 4.2: CPS and LEHD Migration Rates vs. Matched CPS-LEHD Subset 
 
Notes: For the “All LEHD” and “All CPS” migration rates, see notes to Figure 4.1, as these are the 
“LEHD” and “CPS” lines from that series for the interval 2002-2009. The “CPS-LEHD Matches” are 
defined as follows: March CPS ASEC respondents for a given year, who match to LEHD and have 
residential information for that year, the three previous years (i.e., the year pair for which states of 
residence are compared to determine migration, plus the two previous years), and the two subsequent 
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Figure 4.3: Matched CPS-LEHD Migration Rates 
 
Notes: March CPS ASEC respondents for a given year age 16-64 who match to LEHD and have 
residential information for that year, the three previous years (i.e., the year pair for which states of 
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Figure 4.4: Job-to-Job Flow Rates 
 
Notes: Shaded areas denote recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Quarterly data are seasonally adjusted. CPS monthly data are converted to quarterly via addition 
following Hyatt and Spletzer (2013).  The second and third quarters of 1995 are missing one month 
each due to changes made between June and August in the CPS monthly files.  The annual CPS series 
is constructed from the March CPS and coded to the first quarter and ask respondents about the 


























Figure 4.5: Interstate Migration, Residential and Economic 
 
Note: Shaded areas denote recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
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Figure 4.6: Change in Log Earnings 
 
Note: For each category, a point represents the median difference of: log earnings for one year after the 
quarter minus log earnings one year prior to the quarter. The sample is initially restricted to people 
who have earnings every quarter for 4 quarters prior to a quarter of interest and 4 quarters after. The 
“Job Stayers” Sample are people who stayed at the same job during these two years around the quarter. 
“Job Switchers Any, No Interstate Residential Move” are people who had any dominant job-to-job 
flow during that quarter, and who did not have an interstate residential move. “Job Switchers Cross-
State, Interstate Residential Move” are people who had a dominant job-to-job flow across two states 
during that quarter, and who did had an interstate residential move. Shaded areas denote recessions as 















Table 4.1: Correlations Between Migration and Job-to-Job Flow Measures 








Empl.         
CPS 
Migration 
1             
IRS Migration  0.841  1           
CPS Multiple 
Jobs 
0.867  0.703  1         






















1             
IRS Migration  0.665  1           
CPS Multiple 
Employers 
0.916  0.749  1         
ACS 
Migration 
0.835  0.859  0.816  1       
LEHD 
Migration 
0.688  0.917  0.768  0.890  1     
LEHD Job‐to‐
Job 
0.820  0.865  0.835  0.951  0.868  1   
CPS Job‐to‐
Job 
0.915  0.800  0.910  0.951  0.856  0.933  1 
Notes: Quarterly LEHD and CPS job-to-job flows data are annualized by taking an average for each 
year. Correlations are using the year intervals listed above, with the following exceptions. Migration 
data are missing from the CPS series for 1985, and are missing from the IRS series for 1982 and 1983, 
and years 2012 and 2013 are excluded from tabulation because of a significant methodology change 
that affects those years. The ACS and LEHD job-to-job flows series end in 2013. The LEHD migration 
series ends in 2011. The LEHD job-to-job flows series uses a subset of states that are available in the 
year 2000, see text for additional details of the construction of each data series.  The LEHD and CPS 
quarterly job-to-job flow rates have correlations with the ACS migration rate that distinct at the fifth 







Table 4.2: CPS-LEHD Matches: Migration Observed Only in CPS in Year t 
Year 
Observed CPS 
Move Occurs One 
Year Later in 
LEHD 
Observed CPS 
Move Occurs One 
Year Before in 
LEHD 
Border State move 
observed in CPS, no 
move in LEHD, but 
same origin state 
Residual
2002 23.2% 11.0% 20.9% 45.0% 
2003 26.4% 11.7% 19.2% 42.7% 
2004 31.6% 11.7% 23.0% 33.6% 
2005 27.1% 9.4% 24.3% 39.3% 
2006 32.1% 8.0% 22.4% 37.5% 
2007 32.3% 11.2% 20.2% 36.4% 
2008 30.6% 10.2% 19.4% 39.8% 
2009 29.9% 15.0% 23.1% 32.0% 
 Notes: March CPS ASEC respondents for a given year age 16-64 who match to LEHD and have 
residential information for that year, the three previous years (i.e., the year pair for which states of 
residence are compared to determine migration, plus the two previous years), and the two subsequent 







Table 4.3: CPS-LEHD Matches: Immediately Reversed Migration 
Year 
LEHD migration 
and no CPS 
migration 
Migration in 
CPS and LEHD 
 
2002 18.2% 6.8%  
2003 15.8% 5.9%  
2004 14.9% 7.7%  
2005 15.5% 7.6%  
2006 12.5% 11.3%  
2007 14.9% 7.2%  
2008 14.2% 8.8%  
2009 17.7% 9.2%  
Notes: March CPS ASEC respondents for a given year age 16-64 who match to LEHD and have 
residential information for that year, the three previous years (i.e., the year pair for which states of 
residence are compared to determine migration, plus the two previous years), and the two subsequent 
years, who also changed residence in the LEHD between the reference year and the prior year.  
Percentages report the rate at which such moves are immediately reversed: i.e., the state of residence in 







Table 4.4: Employment, Migration, and Job-to-Job Flows 





LEHD      
  Job-to-Job Flow Rate 7.3% 5.0% -2.3% -37.3% 
  Interstate Migration Rate 2.6% 2.1% -0.5% -20.1% 
  Economic Migration Rate 0.8% 0.5% -0.3% -45.5% 
CPS      
  Mult. Empl. in the Last Year Rate 7.0% 3.9% -3.2% -58.5% 
  Interstate Migration Rate 2.5% 1.5% -1.0% -50.2% 
  CPS Migration Reason     
    New job/job transfer 0.9% 0.5% -0.5% -67.0% 
    Lost job/job search 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 2.5% 
    Other job-related 0.2% 0.1% -0.1% -67.2% 
    Family 0.6% 0.4% -0.2% -40.0% 
    Housing 0.3% 0.1% -0.1% -53.2% 
    Other 0.4% 0.3% -0.1% -37.3% 
Note: Rates are calculated for individuals ages 16-64, excluding those in the Armed Forces and 
residing in group quarters, and any observations in the CPS with allocated or imputed migration 
values. Within the CPS, gross residential rates are weighted with the supplement weight. We calculate 
annual job change rates in the CPS March supplement using the method outlined in Farber (1999). We 
follow the methodology outlined in Fallick and Fleischman (2004) to calculate monthly job flows from 
the CPS basic files, then sum them and seasonally adjust to get the quarterly rates. The LEHD job-to-
job flow rate includes both within-quarter and adjacent-quarter transition of a worker’s dominant job 
(i.e. the job associated with the highest earnings). The denominator is the total number of dominant 
jobs. We use the J2J rates from the first quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2010 after seasonal 
adjustment. Interstate migration is calculated from the LEHD data. We consider a person to migrate 
when his residential state within the subsequent year is different from the residential state within the 
previous year. Proportionate change takes the difference between the rate in 2010 and in 2000, and 
divides it by the average of the rate in 2000 and in 2010. Some percentage point do not equal the 
difference in columns due to rounding (differences and proportionate change are exact at two decimal 





Table 4.5: Decomposition of Residential and Economic Migration Rates 
 Residential Migration  Economic Migration 
 CPS LEHD  CPS LEHD
2000 2.4% 2.6%  0.9% 0.8% 
2010 1.5% 2.1%  0.5% 0.5% 
Change -0.9% -0.5%  -0.5% -0.3% 
% of change explained by: 
Worker Characteristics 
Gender 0.0% 0.4%  0.0% 0.2% 
Age 7.1% 15.5%  9.1% 12.0% 
Race and Ethnicity 1.3% 0.8%  1.1% 1.2% 
Education -4.7% -0.1%  -7.8% 0.4% 
Employment, Previous Year -- -1.9%  -- 11.4% 
Employment, Subsequent Year -4.2 % -1.2%  1.8% 24.6% 
Earnings, Previous Year 6.1% 18.4%    
Earnings, Subsequent Year -- 14.8%    
Firm characteristics 
Industry, Previous Year -- -2.3%  -- -1.1% 
Industry, Subsequent Year -1.1% -1.4%  0.1% -0.3% 
Firm Size, Previous Year -- -0.5%  -- -1.2% 
Firm Size, Subsequent Year -- -0.4%  -- -1.0% 
Firm Age, Previous Year -- 3.7%  -- 0.8% 
Firm Age, Subsequent Year -- 4.7%  -- 2.1% 
Note: We group age into the following groups: 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64. 
We group race and ethnicity into Hispanic of any race, White and non-Hispanic, Black and not 
Hispanic, Asian and not Hispanic, and a final category that includes those who are not Hispanic and 
any other race or more than one race. We group education into less than high school, high school, 
some college, and college and beyond. Industries are grouped into NAICS supersectors. Industry in the 
administrative data refers to the industry associated with the worker’s dominant job. Similarly, we use 
the firm size and age of the dominant job prior to migration for the “Firm Size” and “Firm Age” 
categories. We group firm age into the following groups: <1 year, 2-3 years, 4-5 years, 6-10 years, >10 
years. We group firm size into the following numbers of employees: <20, 20-49, 50-249, 250-49, >499 
people. “Earnings, Previous Year” is the total earnings accumulated across all jobs within the year 
prior to the reference year, and “Earnings, Subsequent Year” is the total earnings accumulated across 
all jobs within the reference year. We group earnings into global deciles where the percentiles were 
determined across ten years. We classify an interstate residential migration as workers in the LEHD 
who resided within a different state the subsequent year. The CPS March Supplement is used for the 






Appendix A: Supplemental Figures 
 
 
Figure 4.A1: Economic Migration Concepts in the CPS 
 
Note: Residential migration line is taken directly from Figure 4.1.  Also plotted is the percentage of 
individuals who undertook residential migration and had more than one employer in the previous year.  
Economic migration line is taken directly from Figure 4.5. Also plotted is the percentage of individuals 
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Figure 4.A2: Comparison of CPS Interstate Migration Rates Series for Subset of 
States with Consistent LEHD Data 
 
Note: CPS [R] contains data for the subset of states that have data in the LEHD going back to the year 
2000, for comparison of the CPS time series in Figure 4.1 to the CPS [R] time series in Figure 4.3. 













Figure 4.A3: Economic Migration in CPS and LEHD, CPS only for subset of 
states 
 
Note: CPS [R] contains data for the subset of states that have data in the LEHD going back to the year 
2000, for comparison of the CPS time series in Figure 4.1 to the CPS [R] time series in Figure 4.3. 














Appendix B: Selection and the Returns to Migration 
 
The choice to migrate is endogenous and those we observe to have migrated 
are workers for whom the benefit exceeds the cost. Therefore we measure whether 
earnings changes for migrants only affect a smaller subset of those most likely to 
move, given observable characteristics.  Specifically, we use a straightforward 
propensity-score matching method that assumes selection on observables – that is, 
conditional on a vector of observable characteristics, X, the choice of migration is as 
good as random.  We assume that the probability of a cross-state move follows a logit 






where X includes worker i’s age, sex, race earnings, and the age, size, industry, and 
state of the origin employer.  
With these predicted probabilities, we match using the set of migrants and 
non-migrants with overlapping support. The top panel of Figure 4.B1 presents the 
results. There is some evidence that the gap between job switchers who do not 
undergo an interstate move and those who do widened during the most recent 
recession when we control for observables, suggesting there was much less to gain in 
the economic downturn from switching to a job that necessitated a long-distance 
move.  Overall, the measures exhibit levels and trends that are highly similar to those 
in Figure 4.6.  The bottom panel of Figure 4.B.1 presents matching on the propensity 




more similar to the original figure.  Overall, the returns to migration appear robust to 
our basic approach to accounting for selection. 
Figure 4.B1: Change in Log Earnings, Propensity Score Matching 
(a) Probability of Interstate Residential Move 
 













Note: Panel (a) matches individuals on the probability of undertaking a residential move conditional on 
observable characteristics.  Panel (b) matches individuals on the probability of undertaking any job 
change conditional on observable characteristics.  Change in log earnings is calculated in the same way 
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